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Publicly accessible government information is necessary for Venezuelan citizens 
to hold their government accountable, especially as the political, economic, and health 
crisis worsens. Not only is the implementation of these laws costly, but there is often a 
perceived lack of citizen demand for transparency that further erodes the political will to 
carry out transparency initiatives. To facilitate the successful implementation of freedom 
of information laws in Venezuela, it is necessary to build political will by presenting 
concrete evidence that citizen demand exists. This study aims to find whether there is a 
demand for government transparency among Venezuelan citizens by proposing a survey 
experiment to test the hypothesis that reporting on a candidate’s transparency 
accomplishments increases their approval rating. The design and theoretical framework of 
this study were informed by interviews in Caracas, Venezuela with public officials who 
provide government data and civil society actors who demand it, as well as by a pilot 
 vi 
experiment using a student sample from the University of Texas at Austin. When I repeat 
this experiment in Venezuela, I expect to find that the transparency treatment will have a 
positive effect on approval ratings. This study will fill a gap in the literature about citizen 
demand for transparency in non-democratic, developing countries with high levels of 
government corruption and data opacity. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
As a result of government corruption, bad policymaking, and falling oil prices, 
Venezuela faces skyrocketing inflation and widespread shortages of basic services, staple 
foods, and medical supplies.1 To make matters worse, Venezuela has seen an increase in 
human rights violations, intolerance of dissent, and dwindling democratic freedoms in the 
last few years.2 In addition to political repression, lack of publicly accessible government 
data prevents citizens from holding their government accountable. Government 
transparency and accountability initiatives, such as freedom of information laws and 
participatory budgeting, are becoming increasingly popular in Latin America. Meanwhile, 
Venezuela is trailing behind. Aside from federal anti-corruption legislation, Venezuela has 
yet to adopt either transparency or freedom of information laws. What’s more, Venezuela 
scored 18 out of 100 on Transparency International’s 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI)3, and is among the ten worst performing countries in the world on the Open Budget 
Index, with a budget openness of “scant or none.” 4 
One of the biggest challenges to implementing successful transparency laws is a 
lack of political will on the supply side (i.e. the government). Not only is the 
                                                 
1 “Venezuela Country Profile,” BBC, May 21, 2018, Accessed at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-
19649648 
2 “Freedom in the World 2018: Venezuela,” Freedom House, 2018, Accessed at 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/venezuela 
3 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2017,” Transparency International, 2017, Accessed at 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017 




implementation of these laws costly, but there is often a perceived lack of citizen demand 
for transparency that further erodes the political will to carry out transparency initiatives. 
To facilitate the successful implementation of freedom of information laws in Venezuela, 
it is necessary to build political will by presenting concrete evidence that citizen demand 
exists. This study aims to find whether there is a demand for government transparency 
among Venezuelan citizens by testing the hypothesis that reporting on a candidate’s 
transparency accomplishments increases their approval rating. I theorize that a public 
official who makes additional efforts to be transparent (on top of what is already required 
by law) will be perceived as less corrupt and more trustworthy by their constituents, and 
therefore receive higher approval ratings from citizens.  
Testing this theory in the real world is very difficult, particularly in politically and 
economically volatile settings such as contemporary Venezuela.  Nonetheless, probing this 
nascent hypothesis about the links between transparency and constituent trust is a critical 
question for modern democracies. This thesis seeks to explore the relationship between 
transparency and trust through a proof-of-concept study that lays the foundations for future 
fieldwork in Venezuela once the political situation stabilizes enough to enable fieldwork. 
For now, this thesis seeks to examine transparency and trust by deploying the general 
hypothesis that providing constituents with information about a candidate’s transparency 
accomplishments increases their approval rating among citizens. This hypothesis is 
supported by previous research, which has found a statistically significant positive 
relationship between perception of government transparency and enhanced trust in 
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government5, as well as with higher levels of government approval6 and increased 
perceived effectiveness of leaders.7 This study will fill a gap in the literature about citizen 
demand for transparency in non-democratic, developing countries with high levels of 
government corruption and data opacity. 
The design and theoretical framework of this study were informed by interviews in 
Caracas, Venezuela with public officials who provide government data and civil society 
actors who demand it, as well as by a pilot experiment using a student sample from the 
University of Texas at Austin. When I repeat this experiment in Venezuela in the near 
future, I expect to find that the transparency treatment will have a positive effect on 
approval ratings, but that the positive effect will be lower in Venezuela than in the United 
States. The literature suggests that in situations of economic crisis, trust in government 
tends to goes down8, particularly among less educated and working class citizens who 
typically fair worse during economic downturns.9 Trust in government is also low in 
countries with low institutional capacity10 and high levels of political polarization11 
                                                 
5 Changsoo Song and Jooho Lee, “Citizens' use of social media in government, perceived transparency, and trust in 
government,” Public Performance & Management Review 39, no. 2 (2015): 430. 
6 James E. Alt, David Dreyer Lassen, and David Skilling, “Fiscal Transparency, Gubernatorial Approval, and the Scale 
of Government: Evidence from the States,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 2, no. 3 (2002): 230-50. 
7 Steven M. Norman, Bruce J. Avolio, and Fred Luthans, “The impact of positivity and transparency on trust in leaders 
and their perceived effectiveness,” The Leadership Quarterly 21, no. 3 (2010): 350-64. 
8 Marc J. Hetherington and Thomas J. Rudolph, “Why Washington Won't Work: Polarization, Political Trust, and the 
Governing Crisis,” Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press (2015): 142. 
9 Chase Foster and Jeffry Frieden, “Crisis of trust: Socio-economic determinants of Europeans’ confidence in 
government,” European Union Politics 18, no. 4 (2017): 511-35. 
10 Marc L. Hutchison and Kristin Johnson, “Capacity to trust? Institutional capacity, conflict, and political trust in 
Africa, 2000-2005,” Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 6 (2011): 737-52. 
11 Marc J. Hetherington and Thomas J. Rudolph, “Why Washington Won't Work: Polarization, Political Trust, and the 
Governing Crisis,” 47. 
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because people become disenchanted with the government’s ineffectiveness. Therefore, I 
theorize that Venezuelan citizens will care less about government transparency because 
they have more pressing priorities, such as feeding themselves, or because they already 
have such low levels of trust in the government. 
There are two major research questions underlying this thesis, with related sub-
questions. First, what is the current state of government transparency in Venezuela? 
Specifically, what obstacles do public servants face in providing data, what is their 
rationale for either completing or denying requests for information by the public, and how 
difficult is it for members of civil society to access different types of government data? 
Second, do Venezuelans care about government transparency and does this affect how they 
vote? More pointedly, does reporting on a candidate’s transparency accomplishments 
increase their approval rating, and do Venezuelan citizens react positively or negatively to 
perceived transparency? To answer these questions and explore the broader relationship 
between transparency and political trust, this thesis is divided into four chapters. 
Chapter one will provide relevant background information on Venezuela, review 
the literature available on the subject of government transparency, present the theoretical 
framework supporting my hypotheses, describe the methodology I used to test these 
hypotheses, and justify the importance of this research. Chapter two will delve into the 
qualitative portion of my research and present the findings of my interviews in Caracas, 
Venezuela. The third chapter will cover the design and results of my pilot experiment at 
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the University of Texas at Austin. The fourth and final chapter will present the design of 
my proposed experiment in Caracas, Venezuela. 
BACKGROUND 
The Venezuelan government’s increasing opacity is closely tied to the demise of 
democracy in the country. Democratic backsliding began under President Hugo Rafael 
Chávez Frías in the early 2000s. After a failed coup d’état by the opposition against Chávez 
in 2002, the National Assembly passed the Law on Social Responsibility of Radio and 
Television, which allowed the government to punish the media for expressing dissent. As 
a result, opposition media outlets in Venezuela began slowly disappearing until the media 
was almost completely under government control. In 2009, President Chávez won a 
referendum calling for the elimination of presidential term limits, giving himself the 
opportunity to remain in power indefinitely. His government also frequently jailed 
opposition leaders, judges, and media figures for allegedly inciting violent protests, 
subjecting them to trials behind closed doors.12 These repressive actions were possible 
because the judicial and legislative branches were controlled by the ruling party. The same 
was true for nearly all government institutions, including the Supreme Court and the 
National Electoral Council. 
Since Chavez's passing in 2013, Venezuela has been facing a severe economic 
crisis marked by skyrocketing inflation and widespread shortages of basic goods, services, 
                                                 
12 Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, “How Democracies Die,” New York: Crown (2018). 
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and medical supplies. Although the Central Bank of Venezuela has not released official 
inflation rates since December of 2014, the International Monetary Fund estimates that 
inflation will skyrocket to 13,000 percent in 201813, while other sources estimate that 
inflation has already surpassed 25,000 percent.14 Due to hyperinflation, low-income 
families cannot afford to buy food at local market prices. Instead, they rely on the 
government to regulate the prices of staple foods and other essential products such as corn 
meal, cooking oil, rice, flour, milk, and toilet paper, all of which are carefully rationed due 
to their high demand. These shortages have also extended to critical medical supplies such 
as antibiotics, anesthesia, gauze, gloves, and even doctors, which has resulted in the 
collapse of Venezuela’s health care system.15 Despite the growing humanitarian crisis, 
current President Nicolas Maduro refuses to accept international aid.16 
While falling oil prices certainly contributed to the economic downturn, bad 
policymaking and rampant government corruption are also largely to blame. High tax rates, 
price controls, expropriations, and strict regulation of currency exchange markets led 
domestic producers to operate at a loss. As a result, many manufacturers chose to cut back 
production, close down their businesses, or move production out of the country. These 
                                                 
13 David Biller, “IMF Projects Venezuela Inflation Will Soar to 13,000 Percent in 2018,” Bloomberg, January 25, 
2018, Accessed at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-25/imf-sees-venezuela-inflation-soaring-to-13-
000-percent-in-2018 
14 Steve Hanke, “Venezuela's Inflation Breaches 25,000%,” Forbes, May 31, 2018, Accessed at 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevehanke/2018/05/31/venezuelas-inflation-breaches-25000/#104373926d57 
15 Danielle Renwick, “Venezuela in Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 23, 2018, Accessed at 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/venezuela-crisis 
16 Samantha Raphelson, “Venezuela's Health Care System Ready To Collapse Amid Economic Crisis,” NPR, February 




economic policies opened the door for increased corruption, black-market activities, and 
cooperation between government officials and organized crime. In 2015, several 
Venezuelan public officials were under criminal investigation in the United States for drug 
trafficking, bribery, and money laundering. According to a report by Freedom House, the 
Venezuelan suspects included “managers at the national oil company, a former intelligence 
chief, the commander of the National Guard, the head of the National Assembly, and two 
nephews of President Maduro’s wife.”17  
The regime grew more authoritarian after Chávez’s hand-picked successor, Nicolas 
Maduro, took power in 2013. As the ruling party18 continued to consolidate its control over 
the state, the National Assembly became one of the few opposition-held branches of 
government openly challenging Maduro's policies. In response, the Supreme Court, packed 
with government loyalists, temporarily sidelined opposition lawmakers and assumed their 
legislative responsibilities. After several contentious months, elections were held in 2017 
for a parallel legislative body—a 545-member National Constituent Assembly. The newly 
formed Constituent Assembly, dominated by regime sympathizers, was given the power to 
draft a new constitution.19 
The Supreme Court's actions resulted in mass street protests, precipitating a series 
of violent confrontations between security forces and anti-government demonstrators. 
                                                 
17 “Freedom in the World 2016: Venezuela,” Freedom House, 2016, Accessed at 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/venezuela 
18 The United Socialist Party of Venezuela, founded by late President Hugo Chávez and now led by President Nicolas 
Maduro. 




Security forces and armed pro-regime militias, or “colectivos," were directly responsible 
for the majority of the 136 protester deaths between April and September of the same year. 
By the end of July 2017, over 600 political prisoners had been detained for taking part in 
anti-regime activities.20 With such severe restrictions imposed by the Venezuelan 
government, citizens have little to no incentive to speak out against the ruling party in fear 
of retaliation from the authorities. 
In addition to political repression, lack of publicly accessible government data 
limits citizens’ ability to hold their government accountable. Venezuela scored 18 out of 
100 on Transparency International’s 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)21, and is 
among the ten worst performing countries in the world on the Open Budget Index, with a 
budget openness of “scant or none.”22 However, the CPI is based on attitudinal surveys 
with country experts (usually expatriates) and business people23, whose priorities and 
experiences with corruption, accountability, and transparency in the public sector might 
differ greatly from those of other members of Venezuelan civil society. I conducted 
qualitative research in Venezuela to independently assess the current state of government 
transparency in the country and capture a wider range of experiences. 
                                                 
20 “Freedom in the World 2018: Venezuela,” Freedom House, 2018, Accessed at 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/venezuela 
21 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2017,” Transparency International, 2017, Accessed at 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017 
22 “Open Budget Survey 2017,” International Budget Partnership, 2017, Accessed at 
https://www.internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/open-budget-survey-2017-report-english.pdf 
23 Theresa Thompson and Anwar Shah, “Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index: Whose 
Perceptions Are They Anyway?” Washington, DC: World Bank (2005). 
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LITERATURE REVIEW/THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Michener and Bersch define transparency in terms of visibility and inferability of 
information.24 To be visible, information must be recorded either visually, audibly, or in 
writing. For example, a speech in which a public official provides information to the public 
is not considered fully transparent unless the government provides a video recording or 
transcript of said speech. Inferability, on the other hand, is the ability to draw accurate 
conclusions from the visible information. In other words, visible information must also be 
accurate, verifiable, and useful to the public in order to be considered “inferable.” Michener 
and Bersch use these two dimensions of transparency to assess its quality, ranging from 
poor quality (low visibility and no inferability) to high quality (high visibility and high 
inferability).25  
Transparency with low inferability may impede certain sectors of the population 
from enjoying the benefits of increased transparency. For example, citizens with lower 
education might lack adequate tools to interpret complex data, making them less effective 
at monitoring policymakers and holding them accountable. Using cross-country multilevel 
data, Cicatiello, De Simone, and Gaeta find that citizens with more education enjoy higher 
levels of external political efficacy (i.e. greater government responsiveness) as a result of 
increased government transparency.26 Therefore, the authors argue that governments 
                                                 
24 Gregory Michener and Katherine Bersch, “Identifying Transparency,” Information Polity 18 (2013): 233-242. 
25 Ibid, 234. 
26 Lorenzo Cicatiello, Elina de Simone, and Giuseppe Lucio Gaeta, “Cross-Country Heterogeneity in Government 




should not only provide information, but also improve its ease-of-use and interpretability 
so that citizens with lower education can fully benefit from it as well.27 
The open data movement is a good example of the increasing demand for 
inferability. This movement advocates for the provision of “raw” data that is verifiable, 
accurate, and easy-to-find through searchable platforms. Governments around the world 
are joining initiatives such as the Open Government Partnership and the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative, through which the public can access government data 
as well as visualizations and tools for analysis.28 
Greater access to visible and inferable information increases citizens’ ability to 
monitor the government, hold public officials accountable, and deter abuses of power.29 
Benito and Bastida find that reducing information asymmetry between government and 
citizens can also have a positive effect on political participation in the form of increased 
electoral turnout.30 By having more access to government information, citizens have a 
greater incentive to vote.  
However, increasing transparency alone is rarely enough to combat corruption and 
improve the quality of governance. Transparency only works when coupled with other 
                                                 
27 Lorenzo Cicatiello, Elina de Simone, and Giuseppe Lucio Gaeta, “Cross-Country Heterogeneity in Government 
Transparency and Citizens’ Political Efficacy: A Multilevel Empirical Analysis,” 23-24. 
28 Gregory Michener and Katherine Bersch, “Identifying Transparency,” 236. 
29 John Carey, “Legislative Voting and Accountability,” Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press (2009). 
30 Bernardino Benito and Francisco Bastida, “Budget Transparency, Fiscal Performance, and Political Turnout: An 
International Approach,” Public Administration Review 69, no. 3 (2009): 410. 
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policies, such as increasing accountability and political participation among the citizenry.31 
Fox’s definition of accountability distinguishes between hard (when officials face actual 
consequences for their actions) and soft (when citizens lack adequate means to sanction 
public officials) accountability.32 When a government institution provides access to 
information without having to answer for its actions, Fox argues that it can be considered 
transparent but not accountable. 
Although increasing government transparency is insufficient by itself, it is a 
necessary first step for improving democratic governance and the focus of this study. More 
specifically, this study will address the two sides of government transparency: supply and 
demand. In other words, public servants who provide government data and citizens who 
consume (and presumably act upon) that information.  
On the supply side, there are multiple challenges that obstruct the implementation 
of freedom of information laws. For instance, the relationship between citizens who seek 
access to government information and those who provide it can often be adversarial.33 This 
is especially the case in authoritarian countries or illiberal democracies with cultures of 
bureaucratic secrecy where public servants fear repercussions if they provide government 
                                                 
31 Stephen Kosack and Archon Fung, “Does Transparency Improve Governance?” Annual Review of Political Science 
17, no. 1 (2014): 65-87. 
32 Jonathan Fox, “The Uncertain Relationship between Transparency and Accountability,” Development in Practice 
17, no. 4 (2007): 663-671. 
33 Michele Bush Kimball, “Shining the Light From the Inside: Access Professionals’ Perceptions of Government 
Transparency,” Communication Law & Policy 17, no. 1 (2012): 299. 
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information.34 Adversarial relationships between supply and demand sides might be even 
stronger in highly polarized political environments. From the interviews I conducted in 
Venezuela, I learned that the staff of pro-government officials are hesitant to provide public 
information due to fear of retaliation if the information is used to criticize the government. 
The staff of officials affiliated with the opposition, on the other hand, do not share this fear 
of retaliation and are therefore more willing to comply with citizen information requests.  
Other factors that hinder government transparency include insufficient funding, 
capacity, resources, and lack of political will.35 Several studies have found that larger cities 
tend to be more transparent than smaller cities.36 This might be because larger cities have 
more resources to make information available to citizens. According to the 2011 
International City/County Management Association survey, 42 percent of local 
governments identified a lack of financial resources as a top barrier in providing e-
government services.37  
Public servants in richer local governments tend to have more money, time, 
technology, and/or staff available to implement transparency laws. Public servants in 
resource-starved local governments, on the other hand, might show less willingness to 
                                                 
34 Laura Neuman and Richard Calland, “Making the Access to Information Law Work: The Challenges of 
Implementation,” In The Right to Know: Transparency for an Open World, Ann Florini, ed, New York: Columbia 
University Press (2007): 4, 10. 
35 Laura Neuman and Richard Calland, “Making the Access to Information Law Work: The Challenges of 
Implementation,” 4, 10. 
36 Daniel Albalate del Sol, “The institutional, economic and social determinants of local government transparency,” 
Journal of Economic Policy Reform 16 (2013): 90-107; Alan K. Styles and Mack Tennyson, “The accessibility of 
financial reporting of U.S. municipalities on the internet,” Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial 
Management, 19 (2007): 56-92. 




implement transparency laws because they are underpaid, understaffed, and/or lack proper 
training. Without the relevant knowledge and skills to handle large data sets, public 
servants might end up unintentionally providing misleading or inaccurate data.38 Public 
officials might also have a difficult time providing data when they themselves lack access 
to information from other bodies of government or from within their own agency.39 
Despite these numerous obstacles, Neuman and Calland argue that the most 
important hurdle to overcome is a lack of commitment to the implementation of 
transparency laws among those on the supply side.40 Overworked public servants might be 
reluctant to comply with freedom of information laws, perceiving them as an extra 
burden.41 In addition, several studies have found that public sector employees tend to be 
more risk-averse than their private sector counterparts, possibly because risk-averse people 
prefer the security of public sector jobs.42 Due to their risk oriented attitude, public servants 
tend to be skeptical of innovation, structural changes, or adoption of new technologies 
needed to implement open government policies.  
                                                 
38 Taewoo Nam, “Challenges and Concerns of Open Government: A Case of Government 3.0 in Korea,” Social 
Science Computer Review 33, no. 5 (2015): 561. 
39 Jennifer Shkabatur, “Transparency With(out) Accountability: Open Government in the United States.” Yale Law & 
Policy Review 31, no. 1 (2013): 79–140. 
40 Laura Neuman and Richard Calland, “Making the Access to Information Law Work: The Challenges of 
Implementation,” 10, 2-3. 
41 Suzanne J. Piotrowski, “Government transparency in the path of administrative reform,” Albany: State University of 
New York Press (2007); Suzanne J. Piotrowski and David Rosenbloom, “Nonmission-based values in results-oriented 
public management: The case of freedom of information,” Public Administration Review, 62 (2002): 643–657. 
42 Bernd Wirtz, Sebastian Lütje, and Paul G. Schierz, “An Empirical Analysis of the Acceptance of E-Procurement in 
the German Public Sector,” International Journal of Public Administration 33, no. 1 (2009): 26–42; Margaretha 
Buurman, Josse Delfgaauw, Robert Dur, and Seth Van den Bossche, “Public Sector Employees: Risk Averse and 
Altruistic?” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 83, no. 3 (2012): 1–25. 
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A public servant’s length of service might be another factor affecting political will 
to implement transparency policies. A more experienced public official might embrace 
transparency as a mechanism for delivering high-quality local government services. By the 
same token, long service in public sector positions may produce a disinclination to change 
standard operating procedures that appear to be serving the community well. For example, 
Zeemering found that longtime county administrators were less supportive of exploring 
new opportunities related to service provision than less-seasoned administrators were.43 
Generating political will is not possible without an equally committed demand side. 
Public servants tend to be more politically engaged with the implementation of freedom of 
information laws when these laws are passed to meet a civil society demand.44 
Furthermore, implementing transparency regulations can be very costly in terms of 
resources required (e.g. time, funding, labor, technology, infrastructure, training, etc.). 
Governments are often unwilling to allocate some of these resources towards 
implementation of transparency initiatives if they perceive an insufficient desire for 
information on behalf of citizens.45 A study by Bearfield and Bowman found that when 
public servants perceive that citizens do not want or will not use the information, they are 
less likely to place the data online.46 Before funneling resources into demand-focused 
                                                 
43 Eric Zeemering, “California county administrators as sellers and brokers of interlocal cooperation,” 
State and Local Government Review, 41, no. 3 (2009): 166-181. 
44 Laura Neuman and Richard Calland, “Making the Access to Information Law Work: The Challenges of 
Implementation,” 10, 2-3. 
45 Ibid, 20-24. 
46 Domonic Bearfield and Ann O’M Bowman, “Can you find it on the web? An assessment of municipal E-
government transparency,” The American Review of Public Administration 47, no.2 (2017): 5. 
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transparency initiatives, we have to answer the following fundamental question: do citizens 
care about government transparency? 
Previous research has found a statistically significant positive relationship between 
perception of government transparency and enhanced trust in government.47 Song and Lee 
examine the relationship between citizen interaction with state-run social media accounts 
and their level of trust in government by using 2009 national survey data from the Pew 
Research Center. The study finds that use of government social media can increase 
citizens’ level of trust in government only when it heightens their perception of government 
transparency. The authors argue that government social media services can streamline 
communication between public officials and their constituents, as well as serve as an 
effective means to disseminate up-to-date government information in a timely manner. 
When government social media services are used for these purposes, they strengthen 
citizens’ perception of government transparency and thereby increase their level of trust in 
government.48 
Government transparency has also been found to have a positive association with 
higher approval levels.49 Using cross-sectional data for American states between 1986 and 
1995, Alt, Lasen, and Skilling find that higher levels of fiscal transparency are associated 
with increased gubernatorial approval. More specifically, a one-unit increase in the fiscal 
                                                 
47 Changsoo Song and Jooho Lee, “Citizens' use of social media in government, perceived transparency, and trust in 
government,” 430. 
48 Ibid, 445. 
49 James E. Alt, David Dreyer Lassen, and David Skilling, “Fiscal Transparency, Gubernatorial Approval, and the 
Scale of Government: Evidence from the States,” 230. 
16 
 
transparency index increases average approval ratings by 1.5 percent, independent of other 
factors. In other words, governors of states that publish detailed budget information enjoy 
higher approval levels from their constituents.50 
These studies suggest that levels of trust in government are higher when there is 
more information available about government actions and efforts, with increased access to 
government information leading citizens to believe that the government is acting in their 
best interest.51 Higher levels of confidence in politicians then translate into higher approval 
ratings.52 In this vein, my main research hypothesis is that public officials who make 
additional efforts to be transparent will be perceived as more trustworthy and therefore 
receive higher approval ratings from citizens.  
Hypothesis 1: Public officials who make additional efforts to be transparent will receive 
higher approval ratings from citizens 
Other research has found that government transparency has a limited effect on trust 
in government. Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer conducted an online experiment in which 
four groups of subjects visited different government websites in the Netherlands with 
varying degrees of transparency (low to high) and policy outcomes (good or bad). Their 
study found that the relationship between government transparency and trust in government 
is moderated by citizens’ general predisposition to trust government and their prior 
                                                 
50 James E. Alt, David Dreyer Lassen, and David Skilling, “Fiscal Transparency, Gubernatorial Approval, and the 
Scale of Government: Evidence from the States,” 240. 
51 Changsoo Song and Jooho Lee, “Citizens' use of social media in government, perceived transparency, and trust in 
government,” 430, 437. 
52 James E. Alt, David Dreyer Lassen, and David Skilling, “Fiscal Transparency, Gubernatorial Approval, and the 
Scale of Government: Evidence from the States,” 231-233. 
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knowledge about specific issues.53 Individuals with high prior knowledge about an issue 
are primarily driven by that knowledge. Therefore, their level of trust in government is 
unaffected by increased transparency. Citizens with low prior knowledge, on the other 
hand, are more influenced by transparency. If transparency reveals a positive policy 
outcome, their level of trust in government increases.54 These results suggest that trust in 
government is determined far more by pre-existing ideas, knowledge, and attitudes towards 
the government than one-time experiences with high levels of government transparency 
and positive policy outcomes.55  
A similar study found that government transparency actually had a negative effect 
on trust in government. This finding is also based on an experiment in which six groups of 
subjects were exposed to different government websites with varying degrees of 
transparency (low to high) and policy stages (decision-making, policy proposal, and policy 
outcome). Three of the groups were based in the Netherlands and the other three were in 
South Korea.56 The results show that the transparency treatment had a negative effect on 
trust in government in both countries, but the negative effect was stronger in South Korea. 
The authors attribute this variation to differences between the political cultures of each 
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country. More specifically, South Korea’s political culture has a stronger focus on long-
term policy goals and a higher prevalence of paternalistic relationships between leaders 
and citizens.57  
Taking these two findings into account, my second research hypothesis is that 
candidates that make additional efforts to be transparent will not experience a statistically 
significant effect on their approval ratings, or the effect will be significant but negative.  
Hypothesis 2: Public officials who make additional efforts to be transparent will receive 
lower approval ratings from citizens 
Null Hypothesis: Additional efforts to be transparent will have no effect on public 
officials’ approval ratings from citizen 
All of these studies were conducted in developed countries with lower levels of 
government corruption and higher levels of government transparency. For developing 
countries such as Venezuela, a common finding in the literature is that voting preferences 
and actual voting behavior change when citizens have increased access to higher quality 
information.58 Additionally, informed voters in these countries tend to prefer more honest 
politicians.59 This research supports my main research hypothesis in both Venezuela and 
the United States.  
                                                 
57 Stephan Grimmelikhuijsen, Gregory Porumbescu, Boram Hong, and Tobin Im, “The Effect of Transparency on 
Trust in Government: A Cross‐National Comparative Experiment,” 579-583. 
58 Rohini Pande, “Can informed voters enforce better governance? Experiments in low-income democracies,” Annual 
Review of Economics 3, no. 1 (2011): 220-229. 
59 Ibid, 220-229. 
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However, since Venezuela is also an autocracy, it is important to examine the 
literature on the relationship between transparency and regime type. One study found that 
democracies are more likely to publish policy relevant information than autocracies.60 Yet, 
authoritarian governments are increasingly embracing freedom of information laws or 
policies. The research on this topic suggests that there are various reasons why an 
authoritarian government like Venezuela might want to pursue transparency policies.  
Some scholars theorize that autocracies adopt transparency measures to gain 
legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.61 Maerz refines this argument 
through a qualitative assessment of post-Soviet authoritarian regimes. Her findings suggest 
that while some autocracies indeed adopt transparency measures primarily for an 
international audience (e.g. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), other autocracies are adopting 
these measures to gain internal legitimacy and increase political support (e.g. Russia and 
Kazakhstan).62 
Other scholars argue that autocracies have moved toward greater fiscal 
transparency in the last decade as a strategy to increase foreign investment and 
development assistance.63 Countries like China, Tunisia, Singapore, and Malaysia, for 
                                                 
60 James R. Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff, and James Raymond Vreeland, “Democracy and Transparency,” The 
Journal of Politics 73, no. 4 (2011): 1202. 
61 Jenny De Fine Licht, Daniel Naurin, Peter Esaiasson, Mikael Gilljam, “When does transparency generate 
legitimacy? Experimenting on a Context‐Bound relationship,” Governance 27, no. 1 (2014): 111-34; Joachim Åström, 
Martin Karlsson, Jonas Linde, and Ali Pirannejad, “Understanding the rise of e-participation in non-democracies: 
Domestic and international factors,” Government Information Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2012): 142-50. 
62 Seraphine F. Maerz, “The electronic face of authoritarianism: E-government as a tool for gaining legitimacy in 
competitive and non-competitive regimes,” Government Information Quarterly 33, no. 4 (4): 733-734. 
63 Sheila Coronel, “The right to know: Access-to-information in Southeast Asia,” Bangkok, Thailand: Raintree 
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20 
 
example, have embraced fiscal transparency without adopting access to information laws 
or supporting a free press.64 Unlike other types of transparency, fiscal transparency serves 
the interests of authoritarian regimes because it contributes to the creation of stable 
regulatory environments, which are attractive to international investors.65 
Given that the open data movement seems to be gaining momentum in autocracies, 
several studies have looked at the relationship between transparency and accountability in 
non-democratic contexts. A study of environmental transparency measures in China finds 
that, given China's authoritarian structure, improved governance does not necessarily 
translate into stronger accountability.66 Malesky, Schuler, and Tran reached a similar 
conclusion in a randomized controlled experiment that evaluated a transparency initiative 
in Vietnam. A randomly selected sample of delegates from the National Assembly of 
Vietnam had their transcripts and scorecards from the most recent legislative session posted 
on the web site of the country's most popular online newspaper, VietnamNet. The study 
found that the treated delegates were less likely to participate in the following legislative 
session than non-treated delegates.67  
                                                 
64 Jeannine E. Relly and Meghna Sabharwal, “Perceptions of transparency of government policymaking: A cross-
national study,” Government Information Quarterly 26 no. 1 (2009): 151. 
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Other studies have found that transparency can reduce citizens’ trust in government 
when it reveals improper or illegal behavior by public officials.68 This might be because 
when accountability is “soft” (i.e. when citizens lack reliable institutional avenues to hold 
public officials accountable), transparency may discourage rather than increase civic 
engagement.69 Ferraz and Finan’s 2008 study in Brazil, for example, found that public 
dissemination of corruption scandals in local governments had a negative effect on 
incumbents’ electoral performance.70 
These findings imply that in contexts where government corruption is pervasive 
and rule of law is weak, transparency reforms may not have the positive effects on trust, 
participation, and governance that it has in more democratic contexts. In addition, trust in 
government tends to goes down during economic crises71, particularly among less educated 
and working class citizens who typically fair worse during economic downturns.72 Trust in 
government is also low in countries with low institutional capacity73 and high levels of 
political polarization74 because people become disenchanted with the government’s 
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ineffectiveness. Therefore, I theorize that Venezuelan citizens might care less about 
government transparency because they have more pressing priorities, such as feeding 
themselves, or because they already have such low levels of trust in the government. In this 
vein, my third hypothesis is that the positive effect of transparency on approval ratings will 
be lower in Venezuela than in the United States. 
Hypothesis 3: Greater transparency will generate less trust in government among 
Venezuelans than Americans 
METHODOLOGY 
I used both quantitative and qualitative methods to study government transparency 
in Venezuela. The qualitative component involved 22 semi-structured interviews in 
Caracas, Venezuela with public servants who provide government data and various 
stakeholders who require access to government data. The goal of these interviews was to 
assess the current state of government transparency in the country, as well as inform the 
design and theoretical framework of my experimental study. On the supply side, I was 
interested in learning what obstacles they face in providing data and what their rationale is 
for deciding what to provide and what not to provide. On the demand side, I conducted 
interviews with civil society organizations, journalists, academics, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and businesses. My goal was to learn about their experience 




In addition to qualitative work, I conducted a pilot survey experiment at the 
University of Texas at Austin. This, in turn, informed the design of my proposed survey 
experiment in Caracas, Venezuela. While the original intent of my thesis was to carry out 
the survey experiment in Venezuela, it was not possible to do so because of current political 
and economic instability. Although the results of the pilot experiment are not generalizable 
to the Venezuelan context, the findings informed the plausibility of the experimental 
method, as well as the feasibility and robustness of my study design. When time, funds, 
and political climate permits, I hope to actually implement the survey experiment in 
Venezuela. 
KEY FINDINGS 
My qualitative research showed that the path towards improving transparency may 
be through local governments. Through my interviews, as discussed in the next chapter, I 
learned that state and municipal governments tend to be more accessible than the central 
government. Yet, many local governments lack the resources and political will to 
implement transparency policies. This research is important because it highlights the 
obstacles that public servants face and provides evidence of a strong demand for 
government transparency among Venezuelan journalists, businesses, NGOs, academics, 
and researchers. However, in order to build political will among public servants, it is also 
necessary to generate concrete evidence of a strong demand for government transparency 
among regular citizens. This is what the experimental portion of my study hopes to achieve, 
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detailed in chapters three and four. While similar experimental studies have been done 
before, this study will fill a necessary gap in the literature about citizen demand for 
transparency in non-democratic developing countries with high levels of government 

























Chapter 2:  Interviews 
In order to assess the current state of government transparency in Venezuela, I 
conducted semi-structured interviews with public servants who provide government data 
and various stakeholders who require access to government data. The interviews took place 
in Caracas, Venezuela, from June through mid-July 2016. The goal of these interviews was 
to assess the current state of government transparency in the country. On the supply side, I 
was interested in learning what obstacles public servants face in providing data and what 
their rationale is for either completing or denying requests for information by the public. 
On the demand side, I conducted interviews with journalists, academics, researchers, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and businesses to learn about their experiences 
attempting to access different types of government data (demographic, economic, financial, 
etc.). I chose the semi-structured format to allow the dialogue to remain focused on the 
topic of my research, while still being open-ended enough for interview subjects to express 
themselves in a self-reflective manner. 
In the month and a half that I spent in Venezuela, I conducted a total of 22 semi-
structured interviews. Nineteen of these interviews were with stakeholders (i.e. journalists, 
academics, researchers, NGOs, and businesses), and the remaining three were with public 
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servants.75 The interviews with stakeholders consisted of twelve scripted questions and 
lasted an average of forty-five minutes. The interviews with public servants, on the other 
hand, consisted of eighteen scripted questions and lasted an average of sixty minutes. The 
semi-structured format occasionally allowed for additional non-scripted follow-up 
questions. 
Table 1: Interview Questions for Stakeholders 
Interview Questions for Stakeholders 
1. Do you require any data from the government? If so, what type of data do you 
require? 
2. Is government data easily available and/or accessible? 
3. Does availability and/or accessibility depend on the type of data (e.g., 
demographic, budget, financial, public contracts, etc.)? 
4. Does availability and/or accessibility depend on the level of government (e.g. 
central, state, municipal, etc.)? 
5. In what format is the data available (e.g., PDF, Excel, JPEG, etc.)? 
6. Do you ever make formal requests for data from the government? If so, what type 
of data do you request? 
7. From what level of government do you request data (e.g. central, state, municipal, 
etc.)? 
8. How would you describe the level of freedom of press in Venezuela? Is there any 
room for improvement? 
9. Are you aware of any freedom of information laws or commitments within your 
state/municipality? 
10. What do you think of the state of government transparency in Venezuela? Is there 
any room for improvement? 
11. What political party in Venezuela are you affiliated with? 
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Table 2: Interview Questions for Public Servants 
Interview Questions for Public Servants 
1. How would you describe the level of political participation in your 
state/municipality (high, medium, or low)? 
2. Are there any freedom of information laws or commitments in your 
state/municipality? 
3. Do you receive data requests from citizens? If so, what type of data do citizens 
request (e.g., demographic, budget, financial, etc.)? 
4. Do the requests originate from inside or outside your municipality/state? 
5. How would you describe the degree of citizen demand for government data 
within your municipality/state (high, medium, or low)? 
6. What is your criteria for deciding what type of data to provide and what not to 
provide? 
7. What does the government data provision process entail? 
8. Are there any obstacles that prevent you from providing data? If so, are there any 
obstacles in terms of funding, infrastructure, and/or resources (e.g., time, 
technology, training, etc.)? 
9. How would you describe your experience with citizens who demand government 
data? Has it been positive, negative, or neutral? 
10. Do you require any data from the central or state government? If so, what type 
of data do you require? 
11. Is government data easily available and/or accessible? 
12. Does availability and/or accessibility depend on the type of data (e.g., 
demographic, budget, financial, public contracts, etc.)? 
13. Does availability and/or accessibility depend on the level of government (e.g. 
central, state, etc.)? 
14. In what format is the data available (e.g., PDF, Excel, JPEG, etc.)? 
15. Do you ever make formal requests for data from the central or state government? 
If so, what type of data do you request? 
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16. What do you think of the state of government transparency in Venezuela? Is there 
any room for improvement? 
17. What political party in Venezuela do you affiliate with? 
18. Do you wish to remain anonymous? 
I used a variety of methods to find my interview subjects, some of which yielded 
better results than others. I first tried emailing people and organizations but that method 
had a very low success rate. I then obtained phone numbers from websites and started 
contacting organizations, newspapers, research centers, municipal governments, and 
government agencies in order to find willing interview subjects. That method had a higher 
success rate. I also utilized the “snowball” technique, which involved asking my interview 
subjects if they could refer me to other key informants who may have knowledge of the 
subject matter. I found this method to be the most effective way of finding interview 
subjects. 
FINDINGS 
The consensus among respondents interviewed for this study was that government 
transparency in Venezuela is essentially nonexistent at the national level. Neither the 
stakeholders nor the public officials I interviewed believed that central government data 
(e.g. inflation figures, epidemiological reports, crime rates, etc.) is publicly available or 
easily accessible. They reported that the current level of extreme opacity is a relatively 
recent development, beginning in 2013 when the inflation rate started to rise. As the 
economic crisis deepened, gaining access to government data became increasingly 
difficult. Since 2013, most interview subjects have stopped altogether trying to make any 
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type of government data requests (via email, official letters, or in person) because they 
often proved fruitless. Requests filed online or in paper were almost always ignored. When 
interview subjects made requests in person, they were told that the information was 
classified for national security purposes, even when requesting seemingly innocuous 
information on topics like health or education.  
Stakeholders requesting data were also treated with suspicion and asked intrusive 
questions, such as why they wanted the data and what they were planning to do with it. 
One researcher I interviewed was fired from the Bolivarian University of Venezuela—a 
staunchly pro-government University founded by decree of President Hugo Chávez—
because he criticized the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV) for not publishing official 
inflation figures. When stakeholders were successful in obtaining data, it was because they 
either had the signature of the person in charge of the government body, they had 
connections inside the government, or they pretended to be students. However, some 
officials no longer give information to students because they have realized that it will often 
end up in the hands of academics or researchers.  
Most stakeholders agreed that the degree of transparency varied according to the 
level of government. Municipalities were considered the most transparent and the central 
government was labeled the least transparent, with state governments placed somewhere 
in between. There is also a greater willingness among local government officials to 
implement transparency policies. While there is no national transparency law in Venezuela, 
five state governments have a transparency law and 14 municipal governments have 
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transparency ordinances76. However, the level of transparency within municipal 
governments is often tied to their political affiliation. State and municipal governments that 
are pro-government are more closed, whereas opposition ones tend to be more responsive 
to requests for data. As I learned from my interviews, the staff of pro-government officials 
are hesitant to provide public information due to fear of retaliation if the information is 
used to criticize the government. The staff of officials affiliated with the opposition, on the 
other hand, do not share this fear of retaliation and are therefore more willing to comply 
with citizen information requests. 
The level of transparency also depends on the relationship between stakeholders 
and public officials. According to my interviews, municipal governments that have a 
history of working with NGOs and civil society organizations tend to give more 
information than those that lack such experience. Smaller municipalities are sometimes 
more accessible because it is easier to reach their staff. When small or rural municipalities 
fail to provide information, it is not necessarily because they do not want to - but because 
they often lack the money, time, technology, and qualified staff necessary to process data 
requests.  
When the government does provide data, it is rarely given in a usable format like 
Excel or CSV. These formats are preferred by data users because they allow for easier 
extraction and analysis of data. Yet, most stakeholders reported finding government data 
primarily in PDF format, and are occasionally provided information in a Word document 
                                                 
76 For reference, there are 23 states, 1 capital district, and 335 municipalities in Venezuela. 
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or physical paper. One journalist I interviewed attributed this trend to a lack of “data 
culture,” asserting that officials “do not understand why PDF is not useful for us. They feel 
that it is enough to digitize the information.” Sometime the PDFs are of scanned images, 
further impeding the extraction and analysis of the requested data. As a result, stakeholders 
waste a lot of time cleaning and transcribing data.  
In addition, interviewees describe the quality of data provided by the government 
as being low in terms of timeliness, accuracy, and comparability. As the examples in the 
following sections will show, government data is often not kept up-to-date, is measured 
incorrectly, and does not meet international standards. 
Journalists  
“As journalists, the quality of our work depends on access to public information.” 
~ Mariengracia Chirinos, Director of Information Freedom at IPYS 
The journalists I interviewed mostly required official health data (likely due to the 
high levels of Zika and Chikungunya at the time of my interviews), but also reported 
needing data on crime, education, government budgets, and the economy. However, 
interviewees reported that the government rarely provides official data on any of these 
topics. Journalists are frequently limited to unofficial and anonymous sources, and will 
often go to great lengths to find data. For example, in order to estimate the homicide rate 
in Caracas, journalists will visit the Bello Monte morgue (where all homicide victims in 
Caracas are taken) and ask the guard how many bodies have arrived, or even count the 
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bodies coming in themselves. A reporter for Runrunes, a Venezuelan news website, found 
maternity statistics by going to the Concepción Palacios Maternity Hospital in Caracas and 
getting a signature from the director. The director, distracted in the moment, signed the 
form without realizing the nature of the request.  
Lacking the permission of a high level official is a common obstacle for citizens 
requesting data. Without the signature of the director of the government body, public 
servants will generally refuse requests for information - often fearing retaliation from 
higher ranking public officials. Calling the press department of different government 
bodies also tends to be an ineffective strategy. A journalist for the Venezuelan newspaper 
El Nacional spent a year calling the health minister to request an interview, but never 
received a response. The government frequently criticizes articles by journalists that do not 
use official government figures, even though the government refuses to provide data or 
agree to interviews. 
Freedom of Press 
Declining press freedom has made it increasingly difficult for journalists to operate 
independently and for stakeholders to access information. The 2004 Law on Social 
Responsibility of Radio and Television allows the government to punish media outlets for 
expressing dissent. The government has also punished opposition media outlets by 
withdrawing government advertising, imposing hefty fines, and controlling the sale of 
newsprint. Not only does the government have a monopoly on the sale of newsprint, they 
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also use their control over currency exchange to prevent critical media outlets from 
purchasing newsprint from abroad.  
Constant financial pressure and harassment from the government has pushed at 
least 25 private media outlets to be bought by pro-government business groups, resulting 
in greater censorship and considerably more favorable coverage of the government. In 
April of 2013, just a few days after President Nicolás Maduro was elected, one of the most 
popular opposition television networks, Globovisión, was sold to businessmen allied with 
the government. Less than two weeks later, the new board of directors banned all 
broadcasts of Henrique Capriles’ speeches, the biggest opposition leader and the 
presidential candidate that rivaled both Chávez and Maduro in the recent elections.77 The 
following month, the new owners went on to fire prominent opposition journalists Ismael 
Garcia and Kico Bautista, cancelled the channel’s most popular opinion show Aló, 
Ciudadano, established a list of guests that were prohibited from appearing on air, and 
required journalists to pose certain questions meant to bolster the government’s image.78 
An employee of Datanalisis, a Venezuelan market research company, said that he was 
invited by Globovisión to talk about the widespread shortages of staple goods, but was 
expressly prohibited from using the term “scarcity.” 
In addition to censorship, there is also rampant violence against journalists. An 
NGO that monitors freedom of expression told me in an interview that journalists are 
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frequently detained, arrested, intimidated, physically attacked, as well as have their 
equipment confiscated. This is particularly the case for those seeking to shine a light on the 
current economic and healthcare crisis. Two journalists I interviewed from the Institute for 
Press and Society stated that they recorded at least 546 violations of press freedom in 2016, 
up from 287 in 2015. Due to the violence and harassment faced by opposition media 
outlets, the few remaining radio and television stations that are still independent have a 
adopted a policy of self-censorship. Social networks such as Twitter and Whatsapp have 
therefore become the primary means for Venezuelans to find out what is happening in their 
country. 
Academics/Researchers 
The academics and researchers I interviewed required specific data on the topic 
they were researching. This includes figures on homicides, school performance, domestic 
violence, child abandonment, economic production, employment, and other types of 
economic activity. However, the government data they need to complete their research is 
either unavailable or out of date. For example, the National Institute of Statistics (INE) has 
been conducting a national survey of households since 1967. Yet, as my interviewees 
explained, the necessary adjustments have not been made to the INE survey to allow 
researchers to investigate pressing topics, nor has the survey design been updated to meet 
international standards. INE also charges universities exorbitant rates in order to access 
their information, making much of the required data prohibitively expensive.  
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Academics and researchers reported facing other problems when attempting to 
access data. When information is available, it is usually not disaggregated by category, or 
formatted in a way that lends itself to analysis - making it very difficult to conduct 
econometric and correlational studies. Some ministries, state governments, and public 
agencies publish research reports but fail to provide access to the original data sources. 
Without primary data, it is difficult to analyze, replicate, or otherwise examine official 
statistics. When academics and researchers have a connection inside the government that 
gives them access to data, they often cannot cite the information because it is unofficial 
and therefore lacks credibility. 
Due to these problems, academics and researchers are increasingly opting to 
produce their own data. Two social scientists I interviewed from the Andrés Bello Catholic 
University said that, in 2014, they started collaborating with scholars from the Central 
University of Venezuela and Simón Bolívar University to conduct a survey of living 
conditions. The goal of the Encuesta sobre Condiciones de Vida (ENCOVI) is to monitor 
socioeconomic conditions and attempt to measure the outcomes of government policies 
and social programs. The survey is carried out in large, medium, and small cities 
throughout the country, and covers topics such as poverty, violence, access to food, 
education, employment, health, public services, and vulnerability to natural disasters. The 
results of ENCOVI are used outside of academia as well. Several journalists and NGOs 
interviewed for this study mentioned relying on ENCOVI as one of their few sources of 
reliable data. While ENCOVI aims to fill an important data gap, universities do not have 
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the capacity or resources to collect detailed information at the national, regional, and local 
levels in the way that the government can. 
NGOs  
NGO employees reported a need for economic data (GDP, inflation, currency 
exchange, budgetary, etc.), as well as data on nutrition, food security, birth rates, mortality, 
public expenses, social programs, public policy, and demographics. The NGOs I 
interviewed use this data for a variety of purposes: monitoring freedom of expression, 
improving government transparency, protecting civil liberties, evaluating public policies 
and social programs, and alleviating poverty and food insecurity.  
My interview with the director of Fundación Bengoa, a food security NGO, 
illustrates some of the problems that NGOs face due to lack of government responsiveness. 
Back in the 1990s, it was possible to request data from INE disaggregated by state. The 
National Institute of Nutrition (INN) even offered courses to learn how to use their database 
and food security indicators. However, INN has not published data since 2013 and the 
information that is available is largely inaccurate. Rather than using international child 
nutrition standards, the INN uses Venezuelan standards which are not up-to-date, use 
questionable methods, and are not subject to external evaluations. As a result, health data 





The businesses I interviewed mostly required economic data (e.g., currency 
exchange rate, devaluation of the bolivar, inflation, interest, and international reserves) for 
their market research. This information was previously accessible through the BCV’s 
webpage. According to my interview subjects, the BCV previously operated one of 
the most comprehensive and user-friendly web portals in Latin America. Data was 
published in a regular and consistent manner (monthly or quarterly depending on the 
indicator), and was available as far back as 1950. However, in 2014 the BCV started 
publishing inflation data with delays, and in 2015 it stopped publishing data altogether. In 
recent years, BCV reports have become more politicized and primarily favor the 
government.  
Not only has there been a loss of information, accessing the BCV data has become 
more complex, and its reliability has been undermined by problematic research and 
methodology. Respondents asserted that the BCV does not entirely fabricate inflation data, 
but rather, they manipulate the weights and indicators so that inflation seems artificially 
lower. An employee of Datanalisis reported that they frequently receive requests for 
estimates of inflation in Venezuela. However, as a private company they lack the capacity 
to replicate the methodology of the BCV. Private organizations will instead opt to use 
proxy indicators to estimate inflation, such as a survey of the food sector. 
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Public Officials   
The public officials interviewed for this study included the Coordinator of 
Transparency for the Municipal Government of El Hatillo, the Director of the Municipal 
Government of Baruta, and a member of the Environmental Committee of the National 
Assembly. All three were critical of the government and highly committed to transparency. 
In fact, the municipal government of Baruta has been recognized by the Inter-American 
Development Bank for their commitment to innovation and public service. When David 
Smolansky was elected mayor of El Hatillo in 2013, he received funding from the British 
Embassy to create the first Transparency Office. He also enacted a transparency ordinance 
and signed a commitment with Transparency Venezuela. Therefore, the findings from these 
interviews should not be considered representative of the average public official in 
Venezuela. 
Both municipal governments reported receiving and completing data requests from 
citizens, journalists, businesses, and NGOs. El Hatillo started publishing the balance of the 
municipal treasury when citizens demanded it. Residents have also requested progress 
reports of ongoing municipal projects, complete with status updates and goals met. In 
Baruta, most data requests originate from communal councils. However, both 
municipalities reported a moderate demand for data. The Transparency Office of El Hatillo 
receives an average of three data requests per month. The environmental committee, on the 
other hand, reports a higher demand for information. Unlike the environmental committee, 
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the municipal governments of Baruta and El Hatillo publish most of their data online, 
which might explain why they experience fewer information requests.  
If residents of El Hatillo solicit something that is not on the website, the 
Transparency Office has five business days to provide it. After the request is fulfilled, the 
citizen is contacted by Transparency Venezuela to ask if they received the data on time and 
if the quality was satisfactory. These responses are then used to evaluate the responsiveness 
of El Hatillo’s municipal government. Similarly, when the Government of Baruta receives 
a data request for something that is not available online, they aim to provide the information 
in less than 10 business days. 
Each office employed different criteria to decide what data to provide and what not 
to provide. El Hatillo follows the requirements of their transparency ordinance as well as 
the standards set by Transparency Venezuela. They also examine what information other 
municipalities are publishing in order to outperform them79. Baruta tries to provide any 
information requested by citizens, but there is some data that is confidential. For example, 
certain information about taxes and businesses is not made available to the public in order 
to protect the privacy of citizens and business owners. Similarly, the environmental 
committee is prohibited from providing certain information for national security reasons. 
However, as the committee official explained to me, national security is often used as a 
pretense to hide information that can reflect poorly on the government. For example, the 
                                                 




National Assembly is forbidden from providing mortality data or causes of death. Yet, the 
central government criticizes journalists when they use unofficial data to report on 
homicide.  
I also asked public officials about their experience requesting data from the national 
government. El Hatillo and Baruta reported difficulty accessing economic data (inflation, 
credit, etc.) and information about legislative changes. The respondents asserted that this 
makes it difficult for them to accurately plan their budgets. For example, the central 
government dictates a certain number of mandatory salary increases each year, but fail to 
release that information in advance. This creates a deficit in municipal budgets and causes 
delays in the payment of salaries of municipal employees. Furthermore, the lack of inflation 
figures prevents municipal governments from accurately estimating their budgets for the 
following year. As a result, they end up with insufficient resources and reduced capacity 
to carry out public works. 
 The environmental committee also reported trouble accessing information from 
other branches of government. Through the process of interpellation, the National 
Assembly should be able to obtain information. Yet, in practice, the executive branch is 
limiting that process. When the environmental committee makes data requests on behalf of 
citizens, the requests are either ignored or rejected on the basis that they are 
“unconstitutional.” At the time of my interviews, the National Assembly and its 
committees were facing budget shortages and extreme resource limitations, further 
inhibiting their ability to complete data requests filed by citizens. Respondents stated that 
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they had not been able to make photocopies since February 2016 due to lack of money to 
purchase toner or paper, and that obsolete computer equipment could not be replaced. Due 
to electricity and water shortages, all deputies and staff members of the National Assembly 
are not allowed to stay in the building past 3:00pm, often having to complete their work 
from home. 
The public officials I interviewed identified other challenges they face when 
providing data to citizens: (1) lack of education and training of citizens, who demand data 
but do not always understand the processes of supplying data; (2) lack of qualified 
employees who can effectively meet data requests; and (3) limited budgets, which do not 
allow local governments to improve their computer systems and develop organizational 
capacity. Despite these obstacles, the public officials described their experiences with 
citizens who demand data as mostly positive. As the Coordinator of Transparency of El 
Hatillo explained, “when we give them the information they ask for, they thank us and 
want to participate more in government.” 
CONCLUSION 
At the time of my interviews in 2016, there was an Access to Information law being 
debated in the National Assembly. Transparency Venezuela has spent years advocating for 
a law that guarantees all citizens transparency and access to government data. The 
opposition-held National Assembly, elected in December 2015, was known for being more 
open and giving greater access to information. However, any progress made towards 
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passing this law stalled in 2017, when the Supreme Court dissolved the National Assembly 
and instituted a new Constituent Assembly with a pro-government majority.  
NGOs, journalists, academics, civil society organizations, and even government 
officials have been affected by restrictions on data and are demanding higher levels of 
government transparency in Venezuela. However, it is also necessary to generate concrete 
evidence of the same demand among citizens. The following chapter will present the design 
and results of a pilot experiment testing the general hypothesis that providing constituents 
with information about a candidate’s transparency accomplishments increases the approval 
rating of said candidate. The closing chapter will provide a research proposal to test the 





















Chapter 3:  Pilot Experiment 
Neuman and Calland argue that the biggest challenge to implementing successful 
transparency laws is a lack of political will on the supply side of transparency (i.e. the 
government).80 Not only is the implementation of these laws costly, but there is often a 
perceived lack of citizen demand for transparency that further erodes the political will to 
carry out transparency initiatives. To facilitate the successful implementation of freedom 
of information laws, it is necessary to build political will by presenting concrete evidence 
that citizen demand exists. This study aims to find whether there is a demand for 
government transparency among citizens by testing the hypothesis that reporting on a 
candidate’s transparency accomplishments increases their approval rating. I theorize that a 
public official who makes additional efforts to be transparent (on top of what is already 
required by law) will be perceived as less corrupt and more trustworthy by their 
constituents, and therefore receive higher approval ratings from citizens.  
                                                 
80 Neuman, Laura and Richard Calland, “Making the Access to Information Law Work: The Challenges of 
Implementation,” 10, 2-3. 
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While the original intent of my thesis was to carry out this survey experiment in 
Venezuela, it was not possible due to the current economic crisis and volatile political 
climate. This chapter describes a pilot experiment I conducted at the University of Texas 
at Austin with the intention of informing the design of my proposed survey experiment in 
Caracas, Venezuela. 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample and Sampling 
Due to the short time frame and lack of resources available to design and carry out 
this study, the subject pool for this pilot experiment was selected using convenience 
sampling. In the fall 2016 semester, I enrolled in an experimental methods graduate course 
offered by the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. The main 
requirement for that course was designing and carrying out an experiment. Through that 
course, I gained access to a sample of 1,300 undergraduate students enrolled in an online 
government class (GOV 312L). I chose to use this sample because I did not have sufficient 
funds to pay a survey firm or to find survey respondents through a paid service like Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. 
Out of a maximum possible sample size of 1,300 undergraduate students, I obtained 
869 survey responses. To compare treatment effects across groups and check for possible 
interactions between the treatment and covariates, I asked the subjects to provide 
demographic information. The majority of the students in the sample identified themselves 
as white, male, under 20 years old, liberal, Democrat, somewhat religious, Protestant 
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Christian, and reported having a household income of over $120,000 a year. Table 3 shows 
the percentages corresponding to these sample characteristics. For more detailed 
descriptive statistics of the sample, please refer to Appendix A. 
 
 
Table 3: Sample Distribution 
How is the sample distributed? 
N = 869 
53.44 percent Men 
49.76 percent White 
48.24 percent Less than 20 
years old 
47.42 percent Democrat 
28.19 percent Liberal 
36.87 percent Somewhat 
religious 
31.28 percent Protestant 
Christian 
41.76 percent Over $120,000 
Because my subjects are college students and I used convenience sampling, as 
opposed to random sampling, my sample may not be representative of the entire population 
of eligible American voters. This threatens the external validity of my findings. However, 
there is evidence that student subjects do not necessarily pose a threat to the external 
validity of a study. Druckman and Kam argue that student samples do not reduce 
experimental realism, nor do they differ significantly from non-student samples for a host 
of variables relevant to political science studies (e.g. partisanship, ideology, important of 
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religion, social trust, etc.).81 What’s more, the 2014 United States Census shows that the 
majority of eligible American voters are male (47.9 percent), white (69.9 percent), between 
45 and 64 years old (35 percent), from the southern region of the United States (37.4 
percent), have some years of college education or associate degree (30 percent), and earn 
a household income ranging from $50,000 to $74,000 a year (16.1 percent).82 Apart from 
age and income, the sample distribution for this experiment (see Table 3) is fairly similar 
to the overall population of eligible American voters. 
Assignment to Treatment and Control 
Participants answered five questions on an online survey administered via 
Qualtrics. The Qualtrics software randomly assigned subjects to the treatment and control 
groups, following a protocol of complete random assignment. The purpose of doing 
complete random assignment was to ensure a balanced number of subjects between 
treatment and control groups. However, there ended up being slightly more subjects in the 
control groups than in the treatment groups. Table 4 shows the number of respondents in 
each group. 
Table 4: Treatment and Control Groups 
Treatment Group #1: 219 respondents Control Group #1: 223 respondents 
Treatment Group #2: 209 respondents Control Group #2: 218 respondents 
                                                 
81 James N. Druckman and Cindy D. Kam, “Students as experimental participants: A defense of the 'narrow data 
base',” Institute for Policy Research (2009): 21, 24. 
82 Thom File, “Who Votes? Congressional Elections and the American Electorate: 1978-2014,” United States Census 
Bureau, (2015), Accessed at www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p20-577.pdf 
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Treatment and Control Groups 
The students were divided into two treatment groups and two control groups. All 
participants read one candidate profile. The candidate was either a Democrat or a 
Republican (see below for more details). Each profile contained a brief list summarizing 
the candidate’s accomplishments and stances on various issues. The subjects were asked 
to rate on a scale of one to five how much they approved of the candidate. To read the 
candidate profiles and survey questions, please see Appendix B. Below is a list of the two 
treatment groups and the two control groups. 
 Treatment Group #1: The Democratic candidate’s profile contains an additional 
accomplishment that is related to government transparency. 
 Treatment Group #2: The Republican candidate’s profile contains an additional 
accomplishment that is related to government transparency. 
 Control Group #1: The Democratic candidate’s profile does not contain an 
accomplishment that is related to government transparency. 
 Control Group #2: The Republican candidate’s profile does not contain an 
accomplishment that is related to government transparency. 
I chose to add a transparency accomplishment rather than substitute one of the 
accomplishments because removing an item from the list could potentially affect approval 
ratings. I also chose to include both political parties to account for political bias among the 
subjects. Had I chosen only one candidate from a particular political party and the majority 
of the subjects were affiliated with one political party, their bias for or against the candidate 
could have obscured the transparency treatment effect. By including both a Democrat and 
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a Republican candidate, I can observe attitudinal differences across party lines with regards 
to government transparency. In addition, I chose to conduct a Republican versus Democrat 
analysis because it closely mirrors how I would structure the experiment in Venezuela. 
Although Venezuela has many political parties, most of them align with either the 
government or the opposition.  
Candidate Selection 
I selected two actual candidates, one Democrat and one Republican, from the 
population of United States senators currently in office. I chose Democratic Senator Bill 
Nelson and Republican Senator Lisa Murkowski because they are both fairly moderate 
members of their respective parties. To avoid biasing the survey responses, I did not 
include any personal information about the candidates that could be used to identify them 
(e.g. name, age, gender, political party, etc.).  
I then selected five pieces of information pertaining to each candidate from a list of 
their accomplishments and stances on various issues. I tried to make their candidate profiles 
as moderate as possible by excluding extremist positions and hot-button issues like 
abortion and gun control. By choosing moderate candidates, accomplishments, and 
excluding polarizing issues, the set of outcomes is more likely to approximate a normal 
distribution. This will, in turn, make average treatment effects of knowledge about 
candidate transparency accomplishments easier to detect. 
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Outcome Variables and Covariates 
The main outcome variable in this experiment is the subjects’ expressed level of 
approval or disapproval for each candidate. I measured approval ratings using the following 
five-point Likert scale: 
1: Strongly disapprove 
2: Somewhat disapprove 
3: Indifferent 
4: Somewhat approve 
5: Strongly approve 
 
In order to capture why the subjects approve or disapprove of the candidates, I also 
measured the subjects’ perceptions of the candidates. I did so by asking them to rate on a 
scale of one to five how much the following attributes describe the candidates: moral, 
honest, trustworthy, and “cares about people like you.” I measured perceptions of the 
candidates using the following five-point Likert scale: 
1: Not well 
2: Slightly well 
3: Moderately well 
4: Very well 
5: Extremely well 
 
To compare treatment effects across groups and check for possible interactions 
between the treatment and covariates, I asked the subjects to provide various types of 
demographic information such as gender identity, racial/ethnic background, religious 
preference, political affiliation, ideology, and so on. I asked for this information at the end 




I displayed the distribution of outcomes using a histogram and a fitted distribution 
curve. The central peak and standard deviation of each distribution curve provided the 
average outcomes and standard deviations for the treatment and control groups. I computed 
the average treatment effect by calculating the difference between the central peaks of the 
distribution curves (i.e. by conducting a difference-in-means test). I employed a two tailed 
t-test with unequal variances to determine if the difference between means was statistically 
significant at the 99, 95, and 90 percent confidence levels. I chose a two-tailed test because 
I did not know with certainty whether the average treatment effect would be positive or 
negative. I rejected the null hypothesis if the difference of means was statistically 
significant at the 99, 95, and 90 percent confidence levels. I tested the following 
hypotheses: 
 𝐻0: The transparency treatment will have no effect on approval ratings. 
 𝐻1: The transparency treatment will have a positive effect on approval ratings. 
 𝐻2: The transparency treatment will have a negative effect on approval ratings. 
Data Collection 
The survey was administered over the course of one week, from November 14th 
until November 20th. To increase the response rate, students received class extra credit for 
completing the survey. The link to the online survey was posted on Canvas, the platform 
through which students participate in the online course. As participants clicked on the link, 
the Qualtrics software randomly assigned subjects to the treatment and control groups. For 
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practical reasons, the survey was combined with four other survey experiments. Although 
my survey experiment was only five questions long, the integrated survey was much 
longer. Therefore, it took the students between 15 and 20 minutes to complete the five 
combined surveys. For my section of the survey, see Appendix B. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Dependent Variable Distribution 
Approval ratings for the Democratic candidate were high, whereas approval ratings 
for the Republican candidate were low. This is probably explained by the fact that most of 
the survey respondents identified as Democrats (47.42 percent), whereas a minority 
identified as Republicans (23.77 percent). To display the distribution of outcomes for the 
main dependent variable (approval), I computed four histograms with fitted distribution 
curves. 
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Approval Ratings - Republican Candidate
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Democratic Candidate Analysis 
Contrary to 𝐻1, the mean approval rating for the Democratic candidate was higher 
in the control group than in the treatment group. The same is true for the other outcome 
variables, with the exception of honest. To view summary statistics for all five outcome 
variables, please refer to Appendix C. Because the outcome variables had unequal standard 
deviations across treatment and control groups, I conducted a t-test with unequal variances 
for all five outcome variables (approval, moral, honest, trustworthy, and cares). Table 5 
shows that the differences in means for all five outcome variables are not significant at a 
95 percent confidence level because the p-values are higher than 0.05. These differences 
are also not significant at 90 percent and 99 percent confidence levels because the p-values 
are higher than 0.1 and 0.01, respectively. These results indicate that subjects who read the 
Democratic candidate profile and received the transparency treatment expressed lower 
approval ratings for the candidate than subjects in the control group. They also perceived 
the candidate as being less moral, less trustworthy, and less caring about people like them. 


















Approval 3.856502 3.817352 0.3477 0.6359 0.7283 0.3641 
Moral 3.58296 3.534247 0.5036 0.6926 0.6148 0.3074 
Honest 3.336323 3.347032 -0.1172 0.4534 0.9067 0.5466 
Trustworthy 3.255605 3.187215 0.7268 0.7661 0.4677 0.2339 
Cares 3.29148 3.255708 0.3107 0.6219 0.7561 0.3781 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Due to these unexpected results, I decided to conduct a subgroup analysis for 
various subgroups within the sample. Focusing on the Democratic subjects yielded similar 
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results. The mean approval rating was higher in the control group, as well as the mean 
perception of the candidate as moral, honest, trustworthy, and caring. These results show 
that Democratic subjects who received the transparency treatment expressed lower 
approval ratings for the Democratic candidate and perceived said candidate to be less 
moral, honest, trustworthy, and caring. Although the differences in means for honest, 
trustworthy, and cares were not significant, the difference in means for approval was 
significant at a 99 percent confidence level for both the two-tailed t-test and the one-tailed 
t-test in the positive direction. The difference in means for moral was also significant at a 
95 percent confidence level for the one-tailed t-test in the positive direction and at a 90 
percent confidence level for the two-tailed t-test. Despite these significant results, the 
direction of the differences are contrary to what I hypothesized in 𝐻1 (positive effect). 
Instead, they fall more in line with 𝐻2 (negative effect). 

















Approval 4.455446 4.06383 2.7039 0.9962 0.0076*** 0.0038*** 
Moral 3.920792 3.670213 1.8623 0.9679 0.0642* 0.0321** 
Honest 3.693069 3.5 1.5034 0.9328 0.1345 0.0672* 
Trustworthy 3.633663 3.446809 1.4017 0.9186 0.1627 0.0814* 
Cares 3.871287 3.617021 1.6337 0.9480 0.1040 0.0520* 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
A subgroup analysis with only the Republican subjects yielded more encouraging 
results. The mean approval rating was higher in the treatment group, as well as the mean 
perception of the candidate as moral, honest, and caring about people like the subjects. This 
suggests that Republican subjects who received the transparency treatment expressed 
55 
 
higher approval ratings for the Democratic candidate and perceived said candidate to be 
more moral, honest, and caring. However, the differences in means for all five outcome 
variables are not significant at the 90, 95, or 99 percent confidence levels. 

















Approval 2.947368 3.105263 -0.7758 0.2198 0.4395 0.7802 
Moral 3 3.157895 -0.8851 0.1890 0.3780 0.8110 
Honest 2.824561 2.982456 -0.9141 0.1813 0.3626 0.8187 
Trustworthy 2.807018 2.754386 0.3180 0.6245 0.7511 0.3755 
Cares 2.473684 2.578947 -0.5136 0.3043 0.6086 0.6957 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
In addition to political party, I conducted subgroup analyses with gender, ideology, 
race, religious, and religion. The mean approval rating was higher in the treatment group 
among moderates, conservatives, whites, religious people, and Catholics. It was higher in 
the control group among men, women, liberals, slightly liberal people, slightly 
conservative people, Asians, Hispanics, the non-religious, Protestants, and agnostics. 
However, the differences in means were not significant at the 90, 95, or 99 percent 
confidence levels for nearly all combinations of outcome variables and subgroups. The 
only exceptions were liberals (approval**, trustworthy*, and cares**), whites (cares*), 
Asians (approval*), Hispanics (moral**), non-religious (moral*), Protestant (cares*), and 
Catholics (moral*). 
Republican Candidate Analysis 
For the Republican candidate, on the other hand, the results were in line with 𝐻1 
(positive effect). As predicted, the mean approval rating was higher in the treatment group, 
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as well as the mean perception of the candidate as moral and caring. This suggests that 
subjects who read the Republican candidate profile and received the transparency treatment 
expressed higher approval ratings for the Republican candidate than subjects in the control 
group. They also perceived the candidate to be more moral and caring about people like 
them. However, the differences in means for all five outcome variables are not significant 
at the 90, 95, or 99 percent confidence levels because the p-values are higher than 0.1, 0.05, 
and 0.01, respectively. 


















Approval 1.894495 2.019139   -1.0874 0.1387 0.2775 0.8613 
Moral 1.807339 1.866029   -0.5952 0.2760 0.5520 0.7240 
Honest 2.688073 2.645933 0.4187 0.6622 0.6757 0.3378 
Trustworthy 2.169725 2.148325 0.2057 0.5814 0.8371 0.4186 
Cares 1.802752 1.875598 -0.6733 0.2506 0.5011 0.7494 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
In this case, however, the subgroup analyses yielded statistically significant results. 
Among Democratic subjects, the means are higher in the treatment group for approval 
ratings, moral, trustworthy, and cares. In other words, Democratic subjects who received 
the transparency treatment expressed higher approval ratings for the Republican candidate 
and perceived said candidate to be more moral, trustworthy, and caring about people like 
them. However, only the difference in means for approval is statistically significant at a 90 
percent confidence level for the one-tailed t-test in the negative direction. The differences 
in means for the other outcome variables are not significant. 



















Approval 1.418182 1.59 -1.4938 0.0684* 0.1368 0.9316 
Moral 1.481818 1.54 -0.5379 0.2956 0.5913 0.7044 
Honest 2.490909 2.33 1.1854 0.8814 0.2372 0.1186 
Trustworthy 1.836364 1.85 -0.1064 0.4577 0.9153 0.5423 
Cares 1.390909 1.54 -1.2388 0.1084 0.2169 0.8916 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Among Republican subjects, the means are also higher in the treatment group for 
approval ratings, moral, honest, and cares. This suggests that Republican subjects who 
received the transparency treatment expressed higher approval ratings for the Republican 
candidate and perceived said candidate to be more moral, honest, and caring about people 
like them. However, only the difference in means for approval ratings is statistically 
significant at a 90 percent confidence level for the two-tailed t-test and 95 percent 
confidence level for the one-tailed t-test in the negative direction. The differences in means 
for the other outcome variables are not significant. 

















Approval 3.061224 3.475 -1.6717 0.0491** 0.0982* 0.9509 
Moral 2.612245 2.7 -0.3782 0.3531 0.7062 0.6469 
Honest 3.22449 3.25 -0.1174 0.4534 0.9068 0.5466 
Trustworthy 3.102041 3.025 0.3590 0.6397 0.7206 0.3603 
Cares 2.816327 2.85 -0.1251 0.4504 0.9008 0.5496 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Additional subgroup analyses show that the mean approval rating was higher in the 
treatment group among women, moderates, liberals, slightly liberal and slightly 
conservative people, Whites, Asians, Hispanics, non-religious folks, Catholics, and 
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Agnostics. However, the differences in means are only significant for a few combinations 
of outcome variables and subgroups: women (approval** and cares*), slightly 
conservative people (honest** and trustworthy*), liberals and slightly liberal people 
(cares*), moderates (honest* and approval**), and Catholics (approval*). 
Interaction Tests 
After testing the hypotheses, I conducted chi-squared tests to check for possible 
interactions between the treatment and covariates. I found statistically significant 
interactions between: (1) moral and household income; (2) trustworthy and Muslim; and 
(3) between cares and female, liberal, and Democrat. To control for this specific list of 
covariates, I ran three regressions which served to establish a basis of comparison: 
𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙83 + ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 
𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑦 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝑚𝑢𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑚 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 + 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 
Table 11: Interaction Tests 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 moral trustworthy cares 
treatorcontrol 0.00410 -0.0219 0.0194 
 (0.04) (-0.27) (0.20) 
    
hincome 0.00211   
 (0.09)   
    
muslim  -0.315  
  (-1.39)  
    
gender   -0.0739 
                                                 
83 The “treatorcontrol” variable indicates whether the subject was assigned to treatment (1) or control (0). 
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   (-0.76) 
    
ideology_int   0.0418 
   (0.87) 
    
democrat   0.0683 
   (0.56) 
    
_cons 2.687*** 2.697*** 2.455*** 
 (20.40) (46.80) (13.60) 
N 843 796 838 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 I then generated interaction variables to measure the effect of the treatment on each 
covariate. For example, the interaction between treatment status and gender shows the 
effect of treatment when subjects are female (coded as 0) or male (coded as 1). After 
running additional regressions in which I controlled for the interaction variables, I found 
only the interaction between treatment status and Muslim to be statistically significant. It 
is important to note that only 3.39 percent of the subjects identified as Muslim, so the 
impact of this covariate is likely to be minimal. 
Table 12: Regressions to Control for Specific Covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 moral trustworthy cares moral trustworthy 
treatorcontrol 0.00410 -0.0219 0.0194 0.255 0.0115 
 (0.04) (-0.27) (0.20) (1.03) (0.14) 
      
Hincome 0.00211   0.0244  
 (0.09)   (0.81)  
      
muslim  -0.315   0.236 
  (-1.39)   (0.70) 
      
gender   -0.0739   
   (-0.76)   
      
ideology_int   0.0418   
   (0.87)   
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democrat   0.0683   
   (0.56)   
      
treathincome    -0.0486  
    (-1.09)  
      
treatmuslim     -0.995* 
     (-2.19) 
      
treatgender      
      
      
treatideology_int      
      
      
treatdemocrat      
      
      
_cons 2.687*** 2.697*** 2.455*** 2.572*** 2.681*** 
 (20.40) (46.80) (13.60) (15.21) (46.25) 
N 843 796 838 843 796 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Because these interaction terms are the result of a multiplication between treatment 
status and each covariate, they are better interpreted in relation to treatment status and their 
respective covariate. As you can see from the interaction plots below, treated Muslims are 
less likely to perceive the candidate as trustworthy, treated democrats and liberals are less 
likely to perceive the candidate as caring, and treated women are more likely to perceive 
the candidate as caring. 




Figure 4:  Interaction Plot between Gender and Cares 
 








Democrat versus Republican Analysis 
Lastly, I conducted two t-tests with unequal variances to compare the two treatment 
groups and the two control groups. The mean approval rating was higher in the treatment 
group with the Democratic candidate (3.81), whereas the treatment group with the 
Republican candidate obtained a much lower mean approval rating (2.01). The mean 
perception of the candidate as moral, honest, trustworthy, and caring about people like the 
subjects is also higher for the Democratic candidate. These results show that subjects in 
treatment group #1 (Democratic candidate) expressed higher approval ratings than subjects 
in treatment group #2 (Republican candidate). Subjects in treatment group #1 also 
perceived their candidate to be more moral, honest, trustworthy, and caring about people 
like them than subjects in treatment group #2. The differences in means for all five outcome 
variables are significant at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence levels for the one-tailed 
t-test in the negative direction and the two-tailed t-test, but not for the one-tailed t-test in 
the positive direction. The difference in means test between the two control groups yielded 
essentially the same results. 
















Approval 2.019139 3.817352 -15.6724 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Moral 1.866029 3.534247   -16.6587 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Honest 2.645933 3.347032 -7.2682 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Trustworthy 2.148325 3.187215 -10.2448 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 





















Approval 1.894495   3.856502 -17.4407 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Moral 1.807339 3.58296 -18.6621 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Honest 2.688073 3.336323 -6.7683 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Trustworthy 2.169725 3.255605 -11.2043 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Cares 1.802752 3.29148 -12.9384 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
The approval ratings and perceptions of the candidate as moral, honest, trustworthy, 
and caring were probably skewed in favor of the Democratic candidate because the 
majority of survey respondents reported being politically affiliated with the Democratic 
Party (47.42 percent), whereas 23.77 percent identified with the Republican Party. What’s 
more, a minority of survey respondents reported being ideologically conservative (9.36 
percent) and slightly conservative (12.75 percent), whereas the majority identified as 
ideologically liberal (28.18 percent), slightly liberal (25.15 percent), and moderate (24.56 
percent). 
LIMITATIONS 
The fact that I chose the candidates and prepared the candidate profiles, as well as 
the survey questions, poses a problem. No matter how hard I tried to make the range of 
political attitudes as moderate as possible, my own political opinions might have biased 
the survey design. Additionally, the candidate profiles in the treatment groups are slightly 
longer than the ones in the control group because they list an additional accomplishment 
related to transparency. Therefore, there is a possibility that approval ratings are higher for 
a candidate with more accomplishments. As mentioned in the data analysis, however, 
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subjects in control group #1 (Democratic candidate) expressed higher approval ratings than 
subjects in treatment group #1 (Democratic candidate). This might be due to an 
insufficiently strong treatment or because the subject’s political biases for or against the 
Democratic candidate clouded the treatment effect. 
Attrition is yet another possible limitation. If participants drop out of the experiment 
in a non-random way, the treatment group would no longer constitute a random sample and 
the average treatment effect could no longer be estimated without bias. In order to minimize 
the risk of attrition and increase the response rate, students received class extra credit for 
completing the survey. To increase the need for extra credit, the survey was strategically 
scheduled to be launched after the students turned in their midterm paper. Despite our 
efforts, 71 subjects started the survey and never finished. However, only 13 of these 
subjects made it to my portion of the survey questions, leaving 58 subjects who did not 
answer any of my survey questions. I decided to drop these 58 subjects from the analysis 
because the rows for these respondents were left blank and Qualtrics does not indicate 
whether they were assigned to treatment or control. Without this information, I was not 
able to do any type of analysis to control for those 58 subjects. 
Non-compliance might have also been an issue if students who just wanted the extra 
credit filled out the survey without adequately considering the questions. This would be a 
case of failure-to-treat, in which subjects who are supposed to receive treatment go 
untreated. To detect non-compliance, we decided to include a screener question to make 
sure that the students were paying attention and reading the survey questions carefully. To 
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view the screener question, please refer to the end of Appendix B. The screener question 
asked the students to show that they were paying attention by disregarding the decoy 
question and selecting two specific answers (both of which were the wrong answers to the 
decoy question that they were asked to ignore). Passing the screener question is a good 
indicator that the students received the treatment, whereas failing the screener questions is 
a good indicator of non-compliance or failure-to-treat. We found that 52.25 percent of the 
survey respondents passed the screener question, which means that slightly more than half 
the sample was paying attention and reading the survey questions carefully.  
Because close to 50 percent of the survey respondents failed the screener question, 
I decided to address non-compliance in the analysis. I first conducted a linear regression 
between the main outcome variable (approval) and the variable indicating whether the 
subject was assigned to treatment or control (treatorcontrol). This linear regression yielded 
insignificant results. I then conducted a two stage least squares regression, compared the 
results of both regressions, and found that the results were still insignificant after 
controlling for subjects who failed the screener question. I repeated these steps for each 
outcome variable (moral, honest, trustworthy, and cares) and found the same insignificant 
results. This was the case for both the Democratic and the Republican candidate. 
Interference is another problem to consider, especially since the survey was not 
administered during class time. Instead, the students were able to access the link to the 
survey via Canvas and take it from wherever they were, whether they were at home, on 
campus, or another location. In order to minimize spillover effects, the link to the survey 
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was individualized so that students were not able to share the link with others. However, 
there is a chance that some students took the survey together. If one was assigned to control 
and the other to treatment, or if they were assigned to different treatments, there could have 
been interference. Students could have also talked about the survey with other students 
who had already taken it and influenced their answers, or they could have asked someone 
else to complete the survey on their behalf. 
Another issue with the design is in how I measured the subjects’ perceptions of the 
candidates. I did so by asking them to rate on a scale of one to five how much the following 
attributes describe the candidates: moral, honest, trustworthy, and “cares about people like 
you.” Seventeen subjects complained that they were not given enough information to judge 
the candidate’s morality, honesty, trustworthiness, and level of caring. However, this 
amounts to less than 1 percent of survey respondents. 
Lastly, I was not able to perform block random assignment because we were unable 
to obtain demographic data for the sample prior to the experiment. To avoid priming the 
subjects and thereby biasing their responses, I asked for demographic information (e.g. 
gender identity, racial/ethnic background, religious preference, political affiliation, 
ideology, etc.) at the end of the survey. The problem with not doing randomization within 
blocks is that complete randomization can result in imbalances on covariates purely by 
chance. For this reason, I conducted randomization checks to make sure that the groups 
were balanced in terms of race, gender, religion, political party, ideology, etc. I found all 
of the randomization checks to be acceptable except for Jewish subjects and participants 
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who served in the military. However, only 1.75 percent of the survey respondents served 
in the military and 3.39 percent are Jewish. With such few subjects in each group, it is not 
hard for them to get out of balance and this unbalance could be simply due to random 
chance. 
CONCLUSION 
I failed to reject the null hypothesis for both candidates because the effect on 
approval ratings was not significant at the 90 percent, 95 percent, and 99 percent confidence 
levels. Not only were there no statistically significant effects, but in the case of the 
Democratic candidate the mean approval rating was actually higher in the control group. 
This was still the case after doing subgroup analyses, in which I narrowed down the t-tests 
based on the subject’s political affiliation (either Democrat or Republican). Doing 
subgroup analyses did yield statistically significant effects, but in the negative direction. 
Therefore, I also failed to reject 𝐻2 because the negative effect on approval ratings was 
statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level among Democratic subjects who 
read the Democratic candidate profile.  
That being said, I also failed to reject 𝐻1 because the positive effect on approval 
ratings was statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level among Democratic 
subjects who read the Republican candidate profile, and at the 95 percent confidence level 
among Republican subjects who read the Republican candidate profile. In sum, the results 
of this experiment suggest that Democratic candidates that make additional efforts to be 
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more transparent can expect lower approval ratings among Democrats and higher approval 
ratings among Republicans, whereas Republican candidates that make equal efforts to be 
more transparent can expect higher approval ratings from both Democrats and 
Republicans.  
It is difficult to explain this finding because previous research about partisanship 
and demand for transparency in the United States has produced mixed results. A study by 
Piotrowski and Van Ryzin found that conservatives are more likely to question the need 
for government transparency, whereas liberals are more likely to believe in access to 
information as a civil right and as an essential element of good governance.84 While liberals 
might report a stronger belief in transparency, this belief is not reflected in practice. 
Research by Armstrong found that counties with a higher proportion of Republicans exhibit 
higher levels of transparency85, and a study by McNeal et al. found that states with 
Republican governors tend to offer more e-government services.86 Further research by 
McNeal et al., however, indicates that higher government transparency might be better 
explained by the states’ level of urbanization, wealth, and institutional capacity, than by 
demographic factors such as political affiliation.87 
                                                 
84Suzanne J. Piotrowski and Gregg G. Van Ryzin, “Citizen attitudes toward transparency in local government,” The 
American Review of Public Administration 37, no. 3 (2007): 320. 
85 Cory L. Armstrong, “Providing a clearer view: An examination of transparency on local government websites,” 
Government Information Quarterly 28, no. 1 (2011): 11-6. 
86 Ramona S. McNeal, Caroline J. Tolbert, Karen Mossberger, and Lisa J. Dotterweich, “Innovating in digital 
government in the american states,” Social Science Quarterly 84, no. 1 (2003): 52-70. 
87 Caroline J. Tolbert, Karen Mossberger, and Ramona McNeal, “Institutions, policy innovation, and E-government in 
the American states,” Public Administration Review 68, no. 3 (2008): 549-63. 
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An alternative explanation for why treated Republicans expressed higher approval 
ratings for both Democratic and Republican candidates is that Republicans tend to exhibit 
higher levels of trust in government than Democrats.88 Other research has found that the 
relationship between partisanship and trust in government is tied to which party holds the 
majority in Congress.89 When I conducted this experiment back in 2016, the Republican 
Party controlled both the Senate and the House. Therefore, levels of trust in government 
among Republicans, which already tends to be higher on average, may have been 
magnified by a Republican-controlled Congress at the time of my survey. This might 
explain why Republican candidates received higher approval ratings from both Democratic 
and Republican subjects. 
While the results of the pilot experiment are discouraging, they helped me identify 
ways in which I can change and improve the study design. The following chapter will 
describe my proposed experiment in Caracas, Venezuela. The main differences between 
the pilot and proposed experiments are changes in the sampling strategy and data collection 





                                                 
88 Rima Wilkes, “We trust in government, just not in yours: Race, partisanship, and political trust, 1958–2012,” Social 
Science Research 49 (2015): 356-371. 
89 Joseph Gershtenson, Jeffrey Ladewig, and Dennis L. Plane, “Parties, institutional control, and trust in government,” 
Social Science Quarterly 87, no. 4 (2006): 882-902. 
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Chapter 4:  Proposed Experiment 
Publicly accessible government information is necessary for Venezuelan citizens 
to hold their government accountable, especially as the political, economic, and health 
crisis worsens. However, implementing transparency policies can be very costly in terms 
of resources required (money, human resources, technology, etc.) and there is often a 
perceived lack of citizen demand for transparency that further erodes the political will to 
carry out transparency initiatives. Generating concrete evidence of citizen demand for 
transparency is therefore necessary to persuade public officials to adopt transparency 
measures. This chapter proposes a survey experiment to find whether there is a demand for 
government transparency among Venezuelan citizens by testing the hypothesis that 
reporting on a candidate’s transparency accomplishments increases their approval rating. 
While the original intent of my thesis was to carry out this survey experiment in Venezuela, 
it was not possible due to the current politically and economically volatile environment. 
METHODOLOGY 
Sampling Strategy 
I chose Caracas, Venezuela as the site of this experiment. While conducting a 
country-wide survey including rural and urban settings would be preferable, it is nearly 
impossible without access to detailed demographic data. This information is essential to 
design a robust sampling strategy. There is information available about population and 
political ideology at the municipal level for Caracas that is not available for other cities. In 
72 
 
addition, I chose Facebook as the method of recruitment because it is affordable, easily 
replicable, and ensures the anonymity of participants. 
I hope to improve the design of the experiment by using stratified random sampling, 
as opposed to convenience sampling, within the population of Facebook users over 18 
years old in Caracas. The population of Caracas will be stratified by municipality and a 
random sample will be drawn within each municipality. To increase the representativeness 
of the sample, I will draw samples relatively proportional to the population of each 
municipality. I cannot ensure a fully representative sample because I will be using 
Facebook to recruit participants. I will slightly oversample from the smaller municipalities 
in order to obtain a large enough sample from those areas to conduct a meaningful 
statistical analysis.  
The majority of participants will be recruited from the municipality of Libertador, 
which has roughly twice the population of the other four municipalities combined (see 
Appendix D for a map of the five municipalities within the capital district and their 
population sizes). Libertador also has a predominantly pro-government and less affluent 
population, whereas the four smaller municipalities are more affluent and predominantly 
affiliated with the opposition party. Table 15 shows the proportion of the sample that will 






Table 15: Sample Sizes by Municipality 
Municipality Population Percentage of the Sample Sample Size 
Libertador 2,085,488 55% 1,650 
Chacao 64,629 8% 240 
Baruta 240,755 10% 300 
El Hatillo 54,225 7% 210 
Sucre 600,351 20% 600 
Total Population 3,045,448 Total Sample Size 3,000 
To determine the minimum sample size needed to minimize the probability of 
committing a type II error (i.e. failing to reject the null hypothesis when it is false), I 
conducted a power analysis using the following parameters: 0.05 significance level, 0.9 
power level, two-tailed test, a standard deviation of 0.2, and a minimum acceptable effect 
size (MAES) of 0.18. I arrived at the MAES and standard deviation by examining the effect 
sizes and standard errors observed in similar experiments studying the relationship between 
government transparency and trust in government.90 To be more conservative, I chose the 
highest standard error and lowest effect size I found in the relevant literature.91 I chose a 
two-tailed test because I do not know with certainty whether the average treatment effect 
will be positive or negative. Although the standard power level used in social science is 
0.8, I set the power level to 0.9 to ensure that my study will continue to have enough power 
in the case of significant attrition. Given that my study will have a balanced design, I 
                                                 
90 James E. Alt, David Dreyer Lassen, and David Skilling, “Fiscal Transparency, Gubernatorial Approval, and the 
Scale of Government: Evidence from the States,” 230-250; Stephan G. Grimmelikhuijsen and Albert J. Meijer, “Effects 
of transparency on the perceived trustworthiness of a government organization: Evidence from an online experiment,” 
137-157; Stephan Grimmelikhuijsen, Gregory Porumbescu, Boram Hong, and Tobin Im, “The Effect of Transparency 
on Trust in Government: A Cross‐National Comparative Experiment,” 575-586; Changsoo Song and Jooho Lee, 
“Citizens' use of social media in government, perceived transparency, and trust in government,” 430-453. 
91 Stephan Grimmelikhuijsen, Gregory Porumbescu, Boram Hong, and Tobin Im, “The Effect of Transparency on 




assumed that 50 percent of the study sample would be randomly assigned to the treatment 
groups. With these parameters set, I determined that each municipality would need to 
comprise at least 208 subjects to detect the MAES.92 
I will recruit participants using Facebook advertisements. According to Facebook’s 
Ad Manager, the social media platform hosts 86,000 active monthly users within Caracas, 
the capital district of Venezuela. A $30 daily budget for advertising is estimated to provide 
an average daily reach of between 11,000-30,000 Facebook users.93 This method of 
recruitment will create some selection bias by limiting the sample to Facebook users, which 
most likely differ from the general population. Table 16 shows the characteristics of 
Facebook Users in Caracas versus Facebook Users in the country as a whole94. Despite the 
risk of selection bias, using Facebook as a recruitment and advertising tool will limit 
spillover effects. It will also make it easier to identify the municipalities that participants 
reside in without requiring them to submit their actual address and thus maintain their 
anonymity. Finally, this strategy will provide a methodology that is easily replicable and 
more affordable than working with a survey firm.  
 
 
                                                 
92 I conducted this power calculation using the 3ie Sample Size and Minimum Detectable Effect Calculator, available 
here: http://www.3ieimpact.org/media/filer_public/2016/03/22/3ie-sample-size-minimum-detectable-effect-
calculator.xlsx 
93 Accessed at https://www.facebook.com/business 
94 Accessed at https://www.facebook.com/ads/audience-insights; I was not able to find this demographic data for the 
general population of Venezuela. 
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Table 16: Characteristics of Facebook Users in Venezuela 
 Users in Venezuela Users in Caracas 
Age Men Women Men Women 
18-24 33% 30% 29% 26% 
25-34 33% 31% 31% 29% 
35-44 18% 19% 18% 19% 
45-54 10% 11% 12% 13% 
55-64 5% 6% 6% 8% 
65+ 3% 3% 4% 5% 
Highest Level of Education 
High School 26% 28% 
College 72% 70% 
Grad School 2% 2% 
Data Collection Plan 
The survey will be administered over the course of two weeks to minimize costs of 
running the Facebook ads. To increase the response rate, participants will be compensated 
with some type of monetary incentive. In the pilot experiment I used class extra credit as 
the main incentive. Since this incentive seemed to work well. It is likely that a monetary 
incentive will be similarly effective. The monetary incentive will be advertised in the 
Facebook ad for the study. As participants click on the link on the Facebook ad, the 
Qualtrics software will randomly assign subjects to the treatment and control groups. Once 
they complete the survey, the monetary incentive will be distributed. 
To protect the privacy and confidentiality of survey respondents, I will not ask them 
to provide any potentially identifying information such as their name, birthday, address, or 
phone number. The data will be collected online via Qualtrics and stored in a privately 
shared folder on Google Drive that only I will have access to. Any information that might 
be used to identify participants (such as IP addresses) will be permanently deleted. All of 
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this will be made clear to participants in a consent form prior to any survey questions. 
Respondents will not be able to access the survey questions until they indicate that they 
consent to participate. 
Differences between Pilot and Proposed Experiments 
The main differences between the pilot and proposed experiments are in the 
sampling strategy and data collection plan, because this is where I encountered most of the 
limitations of my study. Another important difference is that I made the treatment stronger 
in the proposed experiment by using a more impressive transparency accomplishment. 
Rather than simply introducing transparency legislation, the candidate in the treatment 
profiles created the first municipal office of transparency and made all budget information 
publicly accessible through the municipality’s website. The rest of the design and data 
analysis plan are the same in both studies in order to allow the results to be comparable. 
The table below summarizes the differences between the pilot and proposed experiments. 
Table 17: Pilot Experiment vs. Proposed Experiment 
Location University of Texas at Austin Venezuela 
Sampling Strategy Convenience sampling Stratified random sampling 
Sample Size N = 869 N = 3,000 
Subjects UT undergrads Venezuelan Facebook Users 
Candidate Profiles Democrat and Republican  Government and Opposition 
Incentive Class extra credit Monetary Incentive 
Treatment and Control Groups 
Participants will answer five questions on an online survey administered via 
Qualtrics. The Qualtrics software can be adjusted to randomly assign subjects to treatment 
and control groups, as well as to ensure a balanced number of subjects between treatment 
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and control groups. Each participant will read one profile containing a brief list 
summarizing the accomplishments and stances on various issues of a hypothetical 
candidate. Subjects will be divided into two treatment groups and two control groups based 
on the political affiliation of the candidate: pro-government or opposition. As in the pilot 
experiment, I chose to include both political parties to observe attitudinal differences across 
party lines with regards to government transparency and account for political bias among 
the subjects. Below is a list of the two treatment groups and the two control groups: 
 Treatment Group #1: The pro-government candidate’s profile contains an 
additional accomplishment that is related to government transparency. 
 Treatment Group #2: The opposition candidate’s profile contains an additional 
accomplishment that is related to government transparency. 
 Control Group #1: The pro-government candidate’s profile does not contain an 
accomplishment that is related to government transparency. 
 Control Group #2: The opposition candidate’s profile does not contain an 
accomplishment that is related to government transparency. 
To create the candidate profiles, I selected four accomplishments/stances associated 
with each political affiliation. The candidate profiles will be as moderate as possible by 
excluding extremist positions and hot-button issues such as abortion and gay marriage. By 
choosing moderate accomplishments and issues, the set of outcomes is more likely to 
approximate a normal distribution. This will, in turn, make average treatment effects easier 
to detect. To avoid biasing the survey responses, I will not mention the political affiliation 
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of the hypothetical candidate, nor will I use terminology that is associated with each 
political party. Please see Appendix E for the list of survey questions and candidate 
profiles. 
Outcome Variables and Covariates 
The main outcome variable in this experiment is the subjects’ expressed level of 
approval or disapproval for each candidate. I will measure approval ratings using the 
following five-point Likert scale: 
1: Strongly disapprove 
2: Somewhat disapprove 
3: Indifferent 
4: Somewhat approve 
5: Strongly approve 
 
In order to capture why the subjects approve or disapprove of the candidates, I will 
also measure the subjects’ perceptions of the candidates. I will do so by asking respondents 
to rate on a scale of one to five how much the following attributes describe the candidates: 
moral, honest, trustworthy, and “cares about people like you.” I will measure perceptions 
of the candidates using the following five-point Likert scale: 
1: Not well 
2: Slightly well 
3: Moderately well 
4: Very well 
5: Extremely well 
 
To compare treatment effects across groups and check for possible interactions 
between the treatment and covariates, I will ask the subjects to provide various types of 
demographic information such as gender identity, racial/ethnic background, religious 
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preference, political affiliation, ideology, and so on. I will ask for this information at the 
end of the survey to avoid priming the subjects and thereby biasing their responses. 
Data Analysis Plan 
I will display the distribution of outcomes for the main dependent variable 
(approval ratings) using a histogram and a fitted distribution curve. The central peak and 
standard deviation of each distribution curve will provide the average outcomes and 
standard deviations for the treatment and control groups. I will compute the average 
treatment effect by calculating the difference between the central peaks of the distribution 
curves (i.e. by conducting a difference-in-means test). I will conduct a difference-in-means 
test between each treatment group and their respective control group, as well as between 
the two treatment groups and between the two control groups. I will employ a two tailed t-
test with unequal variances to determine if the difference between means are statistically 
significant at the 99, 95, and 90 percent confidence levels. I chose a two-tailed test because 
I do not know with certainty whether the average treatment effect will be positive or 
negative. I will reject the null hypothesis if the difference of means is statistically 
significant at the 99, 95, or 90 percent confidence levels. I will test the following 
hypotheses: 
 𝐻0: The transparency treatment will have no effect on approval ratings. 
 𝐻1: The transparency treatment will have a positive effect on approval ratings. 
 𝐻2: The transparency treatment will have a negative effect on approval ratings. 
 𝐻3: The positive effect will be lower in Venezuela than in the US. 
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After testing the hypotheses, I will conduct chi-squared tests to check for possible 
interactions between the treatment and covariates. If there are any statistically significant 
interactions, I will run regressions to control for those covariates. I will then generate 
interaction variables to measure the effect of the treatment on each covariate. 
Opposition Candidate Analysis 
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Pro-Government Candidate Analysis 
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Table 23: Proposed Table for Pro-Government Candidate and Pro-Government 
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Opposition versus Pro-Government Analysis 
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RISKS 
One problem to consider is interference, especially since the survey will not be 
administered in a laboratory setting. In order to minimize spillover effects, the link to the 
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survey will be individualized so that participants cannot share the link with others. I will 
also ask survey respondents if they completed the survey with someone else and flag those 
participants who report doing so. 
Non-compliance might also be an issue if respondents who just want the 
compensation answer the survey without paying attention to the questions. To detect non-
compliance, I will include a screener question to make sure that the respondents are paying 
attention and reading the survey questions carefully. To view the screener question please 
refer to Appendix E.  
Given the short length of my survey, I do not expect non-compliance to be a major 
issue. That being said, if a large enough percentage of respondents fail the screener 
question, I will address non-compliance in the analysis by first conducting a linear 
regression between the main outcome variable (approval) and the variable indicating 
whether the subject was assigned to treatment or control. Then I will conduct a two stage 
least squares regression and compare the results of both regressions. I will repeat these 
steps for each additional outcome variable (moral, honest, trustworthy, and “cares about 
people like you”). If the results are not statistically significant, then non-compliance is not 
a major issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Conducting this experiment in Venezuela will not be feasible until the current 
political and economic crises stabilize. Obtaining honest survey responses will be difficult 
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while political repression is ongoing, and therefore increases the chances of obtaining a 
false negative treatment effect. In addition, Venezuelan citizens might not care about 
government transparency right now because they have more pressing priorities, such as 
feeding themselves or finding life-saving medicine. The ideal situation for conducting this 
study would be if a political party affiliated with the opposition came into power and made 
policy changes to alleviate the economic crisis and restore democratic governance. Under 
such circumstances, public officials might place a higher value on improving the quality of 
governance, and Venezuelan citizens might express higher levels of trust in government. 
Once the circumstances are optimal to conduct this experiment, I will need funding 
to recruit and compensate participants. The Facebook advertisements I will use for 
recruitment cost $30 per day. If I administer the survey over the course of two weeks, 
recruitment costs will amount to $420. How large of a monetary incentive I can afford to 
give participants will depend on how much funding I receive. Since the survey is brief, $5 
might be sufficient incentive for participants to complete the survey. If I obtain 3,000 
survey responses, the cost of compensating participants will amount to $15,000. In total, I 
will require a minimum of $15,420 to conduct this study. 
 This research is important because it could generate concrete evidence of a strong 
demand for government transparency in Venezuela, which is necessary to build an equally 
strong supply side, both of which are essential to the successful implementation of freedom 
of information laws in Venezuela. In addition, this study will fill a gap in the literature 
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about citizen demand for transparency in non-democratic, developing countries with high 























APPENDIX   A 
Passed the screener question: 
- Yes (1): 52.25% 
- No (0): 47.75% 
 
Age: 
- Less than 20 years old: 48.24% 
- Between 20-23 years old: 47.41% 
- Between 24-29 years old: 1.88% 
- Between 30-39 years old: 0.48% 
 
Gender:  
- Male (1): 53.44% 
- Female (2): 44.57% 
- Prefer to self-identify (3): 0.82% 
- Prefer NOT to self-identify (4): 1.17% 
 
Religious: 
- Not religious at all (1): 26.95% 
- Not very religious (2): 24.04% 
- Somewhat religious (3): 36.87% 
- Extremely religious (4): 12.14% 
 
Religion: 
- Protestant Christian (1): 31.28% 
- Roman Catholic (2): 22.99% 
- Muslim (3): 3.39% 
- Jewish (4): 3.39% 
- Atheist (5): 8.92% 
- Hindu (6): 4.02% 
- Buddhist (7): 1.01% 
- Other (8): 7.16% 
- Agnostic (9): 17.84% 
 
Ideology: 
- Liberal (1): 28.19% 
- Slightly Liberal (2): 25.15% 
- Moderate (3): 24.56% 
- Slightly Conservative (4): 12.75% 
- Conservative (5): 9.36% 
 
Political Party: 
- Republican (1): 23.77% 
- Democrat (2): 47.42% 
- Independent (3): 18.74% 
- Libertarian (4): 7.85% 
- Other (5): 2.22% 
 
Race: 
- White (1): 49.76% 
- Black (2): 3.66% 
- Hispanic (3): 14.5% 
- Asian (4): 22.17% 
- Native (5): 0% 
- Other (6): 0.83% 
- Hawaiian (7): 0.12% 
- Multiracial  (8): 8.96% 
 
Household Income: 
- Under $19,999 (1): 7.24% 
- $20,000 to $39,999 (2): 9.61% 
- $40,000 to $59,000 (3): 8.54% 
- $60,000 to $79,999 (4): 8.30% 
- $80,000 to $99,000 (5): 8.90% 
- $100,000 to $119,999 (6): 15.66% 





Control Group #1 Survey 
The following accomplishments and stances on various issues pertain to a candidate for 
US Congress. Although this information might not be enough to properly judge a 
candidate, please do your best to answer the survey questions based on your first 
impression of the candidate. 
1. Voted in favor of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010, otherwise 
known as Obamacare. This law increased health insurance coverage and affordability 
by requiring insurers to accept all applicants and charge the same rates regardless of 
pre-existing conditions or biological sex. 
2. Amended the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 2003 to increase consumer privacy 
protections by requiring businesses to dispose properly of any client information 
derived from credit reports. 
3. Voted against allowing gifts to Congress on behalf of lobbyists in 2006. 
4. Sponsored a bill in 2013 extending subsidized federal student loan rates until 2015. 
5. Voted to repeal Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell in 2010, a law that barred openly gay, lesbian, 
and bisexual Americans from military service. 
  
1. Based on the information above, how would you rate your approval of this candidate? 
1: Strongly disapprove 
2: Somewhat disapprove 
3: Indifferent 
4: Somewhat approve 
5: Strongly approve 
 
2. In your opinion, how does the word “moral” describe this candidate? 
1: Not well 
2: Slightly well 
3: Moderately well 
4: Very well 
5: Extremely well 
  
3. In your opinion, how does the word “honest” describe this candidate? 
1: Not well 
2: Slightly well 
3: Moderately well 
4: Very well 





4. In your opinion, how does the word “trustworthy” describe this candidate? 
1: Not well 
2: Slightly well 
3: Moderately well 
4: Very well 
5: Extremely well 
 
5. In your opinion, does the phrase “cares about people like you” describe this candidate: 
1: Not well 
2: Slightly well 
3: Moderately well 
4: Very well 
5: Extremely well 
Treatment Group #1 Survey 
The following accomplishments and stances on various issues pertain to a candidate for 
US Congress. Although this information might not be enough to properly judge a 
candidate, please do your best to answer the survey questions based on your first 
impression of the candidate. 
 
1. Introduced the Transparency in Government Act of 2015, which seeks to expand 
disclosure requirements for the personal financial information of Members of Congress 
and for foreign travel, gifts, earmarks, and representational allowances. 
2. Voted in favor of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010, otherwise 
known as Obamacare. This law increased health insurance coverage and affordability 
by requiring insurers to accept all applicants and charge the same rates regardless of 
pre-existing conditions or biological sex. 
3. Amended the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 2003 to increase consumer privacy 
protections by requiring businesses to dispose properly of any client information 
derived from credit reports. 
4. Voted against allowing gifts to Congress on behalf of lobbyists in 2006. 
5. Sponsored a bill in 2013 extending subsidized federal student loan rates until 2015. 
6. Voted to repeal Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell in 2010, a law that barred openly gay, lesbian, 
and bisexual Americans from military service. 
 
(Questions 1-5 are the same) 
Control Group #2 Survey 
The following accomplishments and stances on various issues pertain to a candidate for 
US Congress. Although this information might not be enough to properly judge a 
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candidate, please do your best to answer the survey questions based on your first 
impression of the candidate. 
 
1. Voted against extending legal rights for prisoners in the Guantanamo Bay Detention 
Camp in 2006. 
2. Introduced a bill in 2010 that would block the Environmental Protection Agency from 
increasing emission regulations on industries. 
3. Voted in favor of the Marriage Protection Amendment in 2006, which called for a 
constitutional ban of same-sex marriage. 
4. Sponsored the Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act in 2015, a bill to approve the 
construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline from Canada to Nebraska. 
5. Voted against the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010, otherwise known 
as Obamacare. This law expanded health insurance coverage and affordability by 
requiring insurers to accept all applicants and charge the same rates regardless of pre-
existing conditions or biological sex. 
 
(Questions 1-5 are the same) 
Treatment Group #2 Survey 
The following accomplishments and stances on various issues pertain to a candidate for 
US Congress. Although this information might not be enough to properly judge a 
candidate, please do your best to answer the survey questions based on your first 
impression of the candidate. 
 
1. Introduced the Transparency in Government Act of 2015, which seeks to expand 
disclosure requirements for the personal financial information of Members of Congress 
and for foreign travel, gifts, earmarks, and representational allowances. 
2. Voted against extending legal rights for prisoners in the Guantanamo Bay Detention 
Camp in 2006. 
3. Introduced a bill in 2010 that would block the Environmental Protection Agency from 
increasing emission regulations on industries. 
4. Voted in favor of the Marriage Protection Amendment in 2006, which called for a 
constitutional ban of same-sex marriage. 
5. Sponsored the Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act in 2015, a bill to approve the 
construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline from Canada to Nebraska. 
6. Voted against the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010, otherwise known 
as Obamacare. This law expanded health insurance coverage and affordability by 
requiring insurers to accept all applicants and charge the same rates regardless of pre-
existing conditions or biological sex.  
 




People are very busy these days and many do not have time to follow what goes on in the 
government. Some do pay attention to politics but do not read the questions carefully. To 
show that you've read this much, please ignore the question below and just select the 
bottom two options.  
 
How interested are you in information about what's going on in government and politics? 
 
1. Extremely interested 
2. Very interested 
3. Moderately interested 
4. Mildly interested 



















Table 26:  Treatment Group #1 Dependent Variable Distribution (Democratic 
Candidate) 
 









Table 29:  Control Group #2 Dependent Variable Distribution (Republican Candidate) 
 
       cares         219    3.255708    1.132668          1          5
 trustworthy         219    3.187215    1.030107          1          5
      honest         219    3.347032    .9852713          1          5
       moral         219    3.534247    1.032706          1          5
    approval         219    3.817352     1.20529          1          5
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
       cares         223     3.29148    1.284092          1          5
 trustworthy         223    3.255605    .9454264          1          5
      honest         223    3.336323    .9342719          1          5
       moral         223     3.58296    1.000485          1          5
    approval         223    3.856502    1.161329          1          5
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
       cares         209    1.875598    1.106722          1          5
 trustworthy         209    2.148325     1.06609          1          5
      honest         209    2.645933    1.009091          1          5
       moral         209    1.866029    1.038325          1          5
    approval         209    2.019139    1.168339          1          5
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
       cares         218    1.802752    1.128839          1          5
 trustworthy         218    2.169725    1.083432          1          5
      honest         218    2.688073    1.070744          1          5
       moral         218    1.807339    .9974813          1          5
    approval         218    1.894495    1.200179          1          5
                                                                      




Figure 7:  Map of the Five Municipalities in the Federal District of Caracas Color-








                                                 





Control Group #1 Survey 
The following accomplishments and stances on various issues pertain to a candidate for 
President of Venezuela. Although this information might not be enough to properly judge 
a candidate, please do your best to answer the survey questions based on your first 
impression of the candidate. 
1. Supported the Law of Social Responsibility in Radio and Television, which prevents 
radio and television stations from transmitting any content deemed to encourage public 
disturbances by subjecting them to hefty fines or suspension of their licenses. 
2. Granted 20 parcels of land to the central government for the construction of public 
housing. 
3. Voted in favor of the Law of Fair Prices, which says that no business can have a profit 
margin above 30 percent of the cost of production. 
 
1. Based on the information above, how would you rate your approval of this candidate? 
1: Strongly disapprove 
2: Somewhat disapprove 
3: Indifferent 
4: Somewhat approve 
5: Strongly approve 
 
2. In your opinion, how does the word “moral” describe this candidate? 
1: Not well 
2: Slightly well 
3: Moderately well 
4: Very well 
5: Extremely well 
  
3. In your opinion, how does the word “honest” describe this candidate? 
1: Not well 
2: Slightly well 
3: Moderately well 
4: Very well 
5: Extremely well 
 
4. In your opinion, how does the word “trustworthy” describe this candidate? 
1: Not well 
2: Slightly well 
3: Moderately well 
4: Very well 
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5: Extremely well 
 
5. In your opinion, does the phrase “cares about people like you” describe this candidate: 
1: Not well 
2: Slightly well 
3: Moderately well 
4: Very well 
5: Extremely well 
 
Treatment Group #1 Survey 
The following accomplishments and stances on various issues pertain to a candidate for 
President of Venezuela. Although this information might not be enough to properly judge 
a candidate, please do your best to answer the survey questions based on your first 
impression of the candidate. 
 
1. While serving as mayor, the candidate created the first municipal office of transparency 
and made all budget information publically accessible through the municipality’s 
website. 
2. Supported the Law of Social Responsibility in Radio and Television, which prevents 
radio and television stations from transmitting any content deemed to encourage public 
disturbances by subjecting them to hefty fines or suspension of their licenses. 
3. Granted 20 parcels of land to the central government for the construction of public 
housing. 
4. Voted in favor of the Law of Fair Prices, which says that no business can have a profit 
margin above 30 percent of the cost of production. 
 
(Questions 1-5 are the same) 
 
Control Group #2 Survey 
The following accomplishments and stances on various issues pertain to a candidate for 
President of Venezuela. Although this information might not be enough to properly judge 
a candidate, please do your best to answer the survey questions based on your first 
impression of the candidate. 
 
1. Supported the Law of Granting Property Titles to Beneficiaries of the “Gran Misión 
Vivienda” (Great Housing Mission), which was later declared unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court. 
2. Achieved the highest level of trust in municipal police by requiring background checks, 
providing training, and increasing police salaries. 
3. Voted in favor of the Law to Address the National Health Crisis, which forces the 
central government to accept international humanitarian aid. 
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Treatment Group #2 Survey 
The following accomplishments and stances on various issues pertain to a candidate for 
President of Venezuela. Although this information might not be enough to properly judge 
a candidate, please do your best to answer the survey questions based on your first 
impression of the candidate. 
 
1. While serving as mayor, the candidate created the first municipal office of transparency 
and made all budget information publically accessible through the municipality’s 
website. 
2. Supported the Law of Granting Property Titles to Beneficiaries of the “Gran Misión 
Vivienda” (Great Housing Mission), which was later declared unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court. 
3. Achieved the highest level of trust in municipal police by requiring background checks, 
providing training, and increasing police salaries. 
4. Voted in favor of the Law to Address the National Health Crisis, which forces the 
central government to accept international humanitarian aid. 
 
(Questions 1-5 are the same) 
 
Screener Question 
People are very busy these days and many do not have time to follow what goes on in 
government. Some do pay attention to politics but do not read the questions carefully. To 
show that you've read this much, please ignore the question below and just select the 
bottom two options.  
 
How interested are you in information about what's going on in government and politics? 
 
1. Extremely interested 
2. Very interested 
3. Moderately interested 
4. Mildly interested 
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